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4Summary
Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to the change of valence of initially neutral stimuli
due to repeated co-occurrence with valenced stimuli. Broadening this phenomenon, non-
evaluative conditioning (NEC) refers to the change of attribute associations beyond valence
due to repeated co-occurrence of neutral stimuli with stimuli representing an attribute. EC is a
robust and well established associative learning phenomenon; however, which process causes
these EC effects (i.e., valence changes) is not yet absolutely clear. Support for NEC effects
(i.e., attribute changes) was seldom provided and even less is know about the causing
processes.
In my dissertation, I wanted to present a deeper insight into mental activities involved
and, thus, into processes causing EC effects. Therefore, I will summarize and discuss findings
of EC effects and moderating variables, and will also provide own empirical evidence for
moderated EC effects. I will discuss these findings in reference to tow processes assumed to
cause EC effects, namely an automatic process and a propositional process. Considering all
findings, I will conclude that both automatic as well as propositional processes cause EC
effects and, thus, only a multiple-process approach is able to explain all current findings
within EC research.
In the second part of this work, I will provide first conclusive evidence for
conditioning of attributes beyond valence, namely NEC, and will show one method to control
specific NEC effects that ensures only specific attribute associations will be changed. Finally,
I will discuss theoretical implications for processes causing NEC effects as well as practical
implication for the use of NEC procedures within advertisements to create brand images.
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61. Introduction
Preferences play a crucial role in our life and significantly influence human behavior.
Central to preferences is a psychological tendency for evaluation. That is, people evaluate
nearly any experience, objects, or other people to be good or bad and consequently like or
dislike the respective object or person (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001;
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). An intriguing question in social psychology is how
preferences are acquired; that is, which mental processes run in human minds during
preference formation.
Early research by Pavlov (1927) showed that some preferences are learned as a
consequence of stimuli or events co-occurring in the environment. Stimuli or events that
repeatedly occur with positive or negative reinforcement lead to a conditioned response of
approach or avoidance and thereby also to the liking or disliking of the initially neutral
stimulus/event. For example, when a person always receives an electric shock when he hears
a certain tone, he will consequently start to dislike and avoid this tone. This is what is known
as Pavlovian conditioning (PC). Additionally, studies showed that this conditioned response
will diminish if the conditioned stimulus repeatedly occurs without reinforcement or if
reinforcement repeatedly occurs without the respective stimulus. That is, PC is susceptible to
extinction. Furthermore, if a stimulus A co-occurred with a certain reinforcement, and
afterwards stimulus A and X co-occur with the same reinforcement, X will not cause a
conditioned response when it is presented alone. That is, PC is also influenced by blocking.
Finally, studies showed that when a very salient stimulus A (e.g., loud tone) and a less salient
stimulus X (e.g., soft tone) are reinforced together, only A but not X will cause a conditioned
response when occurring alone afterwards. That is, PC is susceptible to overshadowing. In
recent years however, studies about learning of preferences also revealed results which were
in contrast to findings of PC. Levey and Martin (1975) were the first to study conditioning of
pure valence by repeatedly pairing neutral stimuli with positive or negative stimuli, that is,
evaluative conditioning (EC). In the beginning, EC was thought to be a special form of PC;
that is, learning of mere likes and dislikes instead of behavioural or autonomic responses. EC
turned out to be a robust phenomenon shown in diverse studies with broad applicability to
different settings, stimulus types, and modalities (for an overview see De Houwer, Thomas, &
Baeyens, 2001; Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, and Crombez, 2010). However,
studies also showed that EC – contrary to PC – is resistant to extinction, and shows no
blocking or overshadowing effects. Thus, the question was raised whether EC is rather a
7discrete form of learning instead of a special form of PC; and whether different processes
underlie EC and PC causing these different findings.
In the current work, I will elaborate on EC in detail: First, I will delineate EC from PC
by discussing contrary findings of EC and PC effects. Furthermore, I will provide an
overview on the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) as a model describing
preference learning effects. Second, I will discuss several process accounts for EC, and I will
categorize them as either accounts that explain EC effects by an automatic process or an
effortful propositional reasoning process. Finally, I will provide empirical evidence for the
moderation of EC effects and discuss the implications of those results for the underlying EC
process.
The second part of this work is contributed to broadening the EC phenomenon to the
change of attribute associations beyond mere valence changes. As Baumeister and colleagues
(2001, p. 323) stated “’Good’ and ’bad’ are among the first words and concepts learned by
children”. There is a great amount of research concerned with studying valence effects on
human thinking and behavior (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001;
Unkelbach, Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmüller, & Danner, 2008). However, human preferences are
not limited to pure valence; they are rather differentiated including specific attributes. For
example, Peter is not only likeable; he might be nice, honest, athletic, and healthy. Also
abstract concepts like brands are not only positive or negative; they can be associated with
being young, active, and natural, for example. By using simple EC procedures (i.e., repeated
pairing of two stimuli), I will show how stimuli will be associated with these specific
attributes. Hence, I will broaden EC from a mere change in valence to a change in all kinds of
attributes. I will refer to this change in associated attributes as non-evaluative conditioning
(NEC) and will present two studies providing first evidence for conditioning beyond valence.
I will discuss theoretical implications for NEC processes and practical implications for the use
of NEC procedures within advertisements to form brand images. Finally, an outlook to open
questions and further research will be provided.
2. Conditioning of Preferences
The examination of preferences, how they are formed, and what impact they have is
central in social psychology. Preferences refer to the liking or the disliking of stimuli.
Thereby, they affect behavior by causing approach or avoidance tendencies, influencing
whom we like or dislike, and which products we buy. A phenomenon describing the
acquisition and change of preferences is evaluative conditioning (EC). EC is a parsimonious
8way to change likeability of initially neutral stimuli: The mere spatial and temporal co-
occurrence of a neutral stimulus (CS) and a liked or disliked stimulus (US) makes the initially
neutral stimulus more or less likeable (Levey & Martin, 1975). In a standard EC procedure,
the valence changes due to repeated pairing of neutral CSs with positive/negative USs.
As there are many ways in which the EC phenomenon has been described in literature
– as a process, a procedure, or an effect – it is important to clarify the appropriateness of each
definition. According to De Houwer (2007), the EC procedure refers to the (repeated) pairing
of stimuli. The outcome of this pairing is an EC effect, the change in valence of a neutral
stimulus (CS). Furthermore, it is important to avoid defining EC as a process: First, defining
EC as, for example, an automatic process would restrain EC research tremendously. All
possible other processes causing the same effects would be overlooked. Second, as processes
usually cannot be measured directly it would not be possible to determine whether the
assumed process and thereby EC, if defined as a process, really occurred (De Houwer, 2007).
Finally, even if there is empirical evidence supporting one specific EC process, this does not
automatically mean that no other processes can cause the same effects or were involved in
causing the effects. Especially in recent years, research on EC showed how important it is to
not limit the EC definition to one process: Lots of different and in part contradicting findings
emerged. Several theoretical accounts were brought up with more or less divergent
predictions and implications; some of them favor an automatic, others rather a non-automatic
process causing EC effects. There is still a hot discussion within the EC field which process
approach might be best to capture and explain all findings. To prevent confusion and the
problems which follow an EC process definition, I will refer to EC as a phenomenon in which
an EC procedure (i.e., stimuli pairing) leads to an EC effect (i.e., valence change); and I will
not refer to EC as a process. Likewise, I will refer to PC as a phenomenon in which a PC
procedure (i.e., stimuli pairing) leads to a PC effect (i.e., conditioned response).
2.1 Delineation of Pavlovian and Evaluative Conditioning
PC (respectively classical conditioning) refers to the change in behavior due to repeated
co-occurrence of a neutral stimulus (CS) and an unconditioned stimulus (US) triggering an
unconditioned response (UCR); consequently the CS triggers a conditioned response (CR)
(Pavlov, 1927). For operant behavior the idea is that the probability of a specific response
which is followed by reinforcement (respectively US) will increase (Brewer, 1974). In
Pavlov’s original experiment (1927) a dog was given meat (US) which caused salivation of
the dog (UCR). After repeatedly presenting meat and a ringing bell (CS), the dog started
9salivating when it merely heard the bell (CR) but the meat was not present. The central
assumption of PC is its dependency on CS-US contingency. Contingency refers to the
occurrence of stimuli and comprises occasions in which CS and US co-occur as well as
occasions where CS or US occur on their own. Thus, when CS and US always co-occur
contingency is high; when CS or US often occur alone contingency is low. For PC effects to
emerge there must be a high CS-US contingency so that the CS predicts the US, respectively
that the US is expected after the CS (see Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Martin & Levey, 1978).
If CS or US often occur alone and consequently contingency is low, PC effects will not
emerge.
In the beginning of research on valence changes through conditioning, researchers
considered EC to be a special form of PC, like Levey and Martin when they wrote their article
“Classical conditioning of human evaluative responses” (1975). More specifically according
to Levey and Martin (see also Martin & Levey, 1978), the first response to a stimulus is an
evaluative one, and this evaluation causes a behavioral or autonomic response. What is
learned is the evaluation (evaluative response) in the first place which is a precondition of the
behavioral/autonomic response (CR). Thus, EC and PC effects always emerge together as a
consequence of co-occurring stimuli.
During the following decades, Levey and Martin’s (1975) assumption of EC as a special
case of PC has been challenged both theoretically and empirically. Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez,
and Van den Berg (1992a; and also Baeyens, Eelen, Van den Berg, and Crombez, 1992b)
assumed different processes and representational structures of PC and EC. Specifically, they
defined PC as a form of signal learning which is based on CS-US contingency (see also
Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). Thus, repeated co-occurrence of CS and US leads to the
expectancy that after the CS the US occurs; consequently the CS will cause a behavioral or
autonomic CR. However, this is only true for CS and US always co-occurring and not
occurring alone, that is, if there is high CS-US contingency. EC on the other hand is not based
on CS-US contingency but rather on mere CS-US contiguity. Contiguity refers to the co-
occurrence of stimuli and comprises only occasions in which CS and US co-occur, but not
occasions where CS or US occur alone. Thus, for EC effects to emerge CS and US must
repeatedly co-occur, that is, contiguity must be high, but it is not relevant whether CS or US
also occur alone. Baeyens, Eelen, and Crombez (1995; see also Baeyens & De Houwer, 1995)
distinguished between two systems involved in PC and EC, which react to input differently,
cause different information processing, and lead to different behavior: An expectancy-system
and a referential-system. The expectancy-system detects reliable signals for USs; CSs co-
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occurring with USs are such signals. Consequently, CSs activate the response to the expected
USs; however, responses will only be triggered by salient, non-redundant CSs which co-occur
in high statistical contingency with the USs (i.e., CSs and USs occur together but do not occur
alone). To establish such USs expectancies learning organisms must be aware of CS-US
contingencies; that is, they must have conscious knowledge that CS and US always co-occur
and the CS, thus, predicts the US. In contrast, when contingency is reduced as CS or US often
occur alone a CS will not lead to expecting the US and a CR will not emerge anymore.
According to Baeyens and colleagues, the expectancy-system is involved in PC. Studies about
PC support their assumption of an expectancy-system and the central role that CS-US
contingency plays: First, studies showed that PC is sensible to extinction; that is, if a CS after
conditioning repeatedly occurs alone the CR will diminish and finally not emerge anymore.
CS occurrence without the US decreases CS-US contingency, consequently, the CS does not
cause US expectancy anymore and the CR will not occur anymore. For example, Vervliet,
Vansteenwegen, and Hermans (2010) demonstrated that participants showed lower shock
expectancy ratings and less change in tonic skin conductance level to a figure (CS) when it
was shown repeatedly without a following shock in the extinction phase after conditioning.
Second, there are blocking effects for PC (Kamin, 1969): When CS1 repeatedly co-occurred
with a US, and later CS1 and CS2 repeatedly co-occur with the same US at the same time,
CS2 will not cause a CR when presented alone afterwards. CS1 already predicts the US; thus,
CS2 is redundant. For example, Michtell & Lovibond (2002) demonstrated that participants
showed lower shock expectancy ratings and less change in tonic skin conductance level when
CS2 occurred alone after learning that the shock follows CS1 and CS2. Third, studies showed
overshadowing effects; that is, CS2 will not cause a CR when it occurs alone after its co-
occurrence with CS1 and US if CS1 is a very salient stimulus. Another kind of
overshadowing effect would be that single CSs elicit stronger CRs than more CSs conditioned
together as it is more salient that this single CS predicts the US. For example, Rübeling
(Experiment 2, 1993) showed that participants were slower and less accurate in stopping a
moving target on a screen when they heard a tone (CS1) and felt a vibration (CS) (compound
trials) than when they only heard the tone or felt the vibration (alone trials).
Contrary to the expectancy-system, the referential-system is only sensible for CS-US
contiguity; that is, CS-US co-occurrence is important while it is irrelevant whether CS or US
also occur alone (i.e., no high CS-US contingency is necessary). Consequently, as CSs do not
cause US expectancy no extinction as well as no blocking should occur. According to
Baeyens and colleagues (1995) the referential-system is involved in EC. Assumptions and
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predictions based on this referential-system influencing likes and dislikes are not in line with
findings in PC studies. This led to the assumption that EC effects (i.e., valence changes) and
PC effects (i.e., learning behavioral or autonomic responses) are caused by different processes
and thus EC and PC are different phenomena.
Since then several empirical studies provided support for Baeyens and colleagues’
(1992a; 1995) assumption about EC as a distinct form of conditioning. Support for the
resistance to extinction was provided for example by Kerkhof, Vasteenwegen, Baeyens, and
Hermans (2011) who conditioned cookies (visual CSs) with sweet or bitter cookies
participants had to eat (haptic USs). After conditioning, some of the cookie CSs were
presented alone in an extinction phase. These cookie CSs were rated as equally pleasant as the
cookie CSs not presented in the extinction phase, showing resistance to extinction. Also the
meta-analysis by Hofmann and colleagues (2010) supports the assumption that conditioned
valence persists when CSs are presented alone, although EC effects were slightly smaller after
extinction. Dwyer, Jarratt, and Dick (2007) showed that EC is resistant to extinction, too. Yet,
they also showed that there is no difference between likeability ratings of foods (CSs) paired
with obese body shapes (negative USs) alone, or foods (CSs) paired with obese body shapes
together with another salient food CS. That is, they showed no effect of overshadowing.
Finally, Beckers, De Vicq, and Baeyens (2009) showed that EC is insensitive to blocking.
One group of children learned that letter strings were associated with a certain candy gain or
loss (initial conditioning) and in a second experimental session learned that the same letter
strings now presented together with other neutral strings led to the same candy gain or loss
(blocking treatment). Another children group only participated in the initial conditioning
phase. Afterwards both groups rated the initial letter strings equally on likeability showing
that there were no blocking effects.
Thus based on all opposed findings within EC and PC research, EC is assumed to be a
distinct form of conditioning instead of a special form of PC. EC depends on CS-US
contiguity; consequently, EC is resistant to extinction, and it is not influenced by blocking or
overshadowing. PC, on the other hand, depends on CS-US contingency; consequently, PC is
not resistant to extinction, and it will be influenced by blocking or overshadowing.
In the current chapter, I delineated PC and EC by summarizing how distinct learning
settings, like extinction, blocking, and overshadowing, have a different influence on PC and
EC effects. In the following chapter, I will provide an overview on a formalized mathematical
model describing effects of preference learning: The Rescorla-Wagner model.
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2.2 The Rescorla-Wagner Model Describing Conditioning Effects
Rescorla and Wagner (1972) assembled their earlier assumptions about learning caused
by co-occurring stimuli into a formalized mathematical model. Like the PC phenomenon, the
Rescorla-Wagner model describes conditioning effects; it does this by mathematical
calculations which also allow for effect predictions. The Rescorla-Wagner model is based on
a discrepancy model of conditioning; that is, “conditioning depends on there being a
discrepancy between the outcome of a trial
1
and the reinforcement expected on that trial”
(Mackintosh, 1983, p. 189) and only when there is an unexpected outcome actions will
change and conditioning will emerge. The model’s basics are as follows (Rescorla & Wagner,
1972): The effects of reinforcement (i.e., US is present when CS occurs) and non-
reinforcement (i.e., US is absent when CS occurs) on a stimulus X’s associative strength, that
is, the strength of the link between CS X and US representations, depend not only on the
existing associative strength of this stimulus X. The effects also depend on the associative
strength of stimulus A co-occurring with this stimulus X. When the strength of all compound
stimuli (i.e., co-occurring stimuli) is low, reinforcement will have high influence; however,
when it is already high, reinforcement will only have minor influence. For non-reinforcement
this is quite comparable: If the US is absent when a compound AX occurs this leads to big
decreases in learned behavior (CR) when the compound’s associative strength in sum was
high, and to small decreases when strength in sum was low. This resembles the fundamental
difference to Hull’s learning model (1943): Hull’s model only considers associative strength
of the respective stimulus; the Rescorla-Wagner model considers the associative strength of
all stimuli occurring together. Consequently, high contiguity of a neutral stimulus and
reinforcement is not enough for learning; only if a stimulus predicts reinforcement better than
other stimuli – that is, there is higher statistical contingency between CS1 and US than
between CS2 and US – conditioning effects will emerge. Thus as for PC, not contiguity but
contingency is central in the Rescorla-Wagner model (Mackintosh, 1983), that is, not only
trials with co-occurring stimuli are taken into account but also trials with stimuli occurring
alone.
On a formalized level, the Rescorla-Wagner model is based on a linear learning model
)(
nn
pp −=Δ λβ
where resembles the response probability in a trial,
n
pΔ β and λ resemble learning rate and
learning asymptote which are both dependent on CS and US in a trial. Thus, de-/ increase of
1
A trial refers to a single occurrence of stimuli. As conditioning depends on repeated occurrences of stimuli it is
a trial-by-trial learning.
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learning in a given trial depend on the response already conditioned to the CS and the
asymptote which is supported by the US. The Rescorla-Wagner model comprises three major
modifications: First, it describes learning curves for association strengths, but not for response
probabilities; that is, how links between stimuli are strengthened or weakened through
conditioning. Second, learning depends on different external stimuli; for each stimulus i the
associative strength is V
i
with positive values indicating excitatory conditioning and negative
values indicating inhibitory conditioning. Excitatory conditioning refers to building excitatory
associative links where there is a positive relationship between CS and US, and the CS elicits
a certain CR. Inhibitory conditioning refers to building inhibitory associative links where
there is a negative relationship between CS and US, and the CS does not elicit a certain CR
(Mackintosh, 1983). And third, when a US follows a compound AX the change of all
components’ A and X associative strengths are a function of V
AX
; that is, they depend on the
strength of the stimulus compound, not of the single stimuli.
Thus according to Rescorla and Wagner (1972), the model about associative learning is
formalized as
XAAX
VVV +=
and further, if a US
1
follows a compound AX the associative strengths of the components are
)(
11 AXAA
VV −=Δ λβα )(
11 AXXX
VV −=Δ λβα .
Therein,
i
α resembles the learning rate parameter associated with each component. It
represents the stimulus salience and reflects that different stimuli acquire associative strength
differing in speed despite the same reinforcement.
j
β resembles the learning rate parameter
associated with the US; thus, learning depends on the respective US
j
. And
j
λ resembles the
asymptotic level of the associative strength supported by the respective US
j
.
To clarify the implications of their model, Rescorla and Wagner (1972) elaborated on
two reinforcement scenarios of compound stimuli. A first scenario is that A was pre-
conditioned and A has already acquired associative strength (V
A
is high). Thus, conditioning
of the compound AX has only a small influence on X’s associative strength as depends
on
X
VΔ
AX
V−
1
λ and V
AX
in turn depends on V
A
; thus,
X
VΔ is small. However, if V
A
is negative as
A was conditioned as an inhibitor,
AX
V−
1
λ is large and thus, reinforcement of AX has a larger
influence on . A second scenario is that A and AX are reinforced in the same session.
That is, in trials reinforcing A V
A
grows, thus, also V
AX
grows, and as a consequence V
X
is
small (i.e., blocking of learning for X). However, in trials reinforcing the compound AX V
AX
grows and thereby also V
X
grows, at least early in conditioning. Since V
A
grows until it
X
VΔ
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reaches the size of λ as A is reinforced in the A alone and AX trials, V
AX
exceeds the value of
λ . As a consequence, further AX reinforcement decreases the associative strength of the
components. It is an important feature of the model that further reinforcement of the
components not only increases but at a certain point decreases associative strength when V
AX
exceeded λ .
The Rescorla-Wagner model is able to describe the most intriguing findings within PC
in a mathematical way. First, it describes blocking (Kamin, 1969): Stimulus X reinforced in
AX trials by a US will acquire no associative strength and elicit no CR (i.e., low V
X
) when
stimulus A was already reinforced by the same US in prior A-alone trials (i.e., V
A
is already
high). Second, it describes overshadowing: Stimulus X after being reinforced in AX trials
elicits no CR when stimulus A is very salient (i.e.,
A
α is much higher than
X
α ). Third, as a
central model assumption is CS-US contingency, the model is able to describe extinction of
conditioned responses: A conditioned stimulus X after several trials without a co-occurring
US (decreasing contingency) does not elicit a CR anymore; X loses associative strength
because of non-reinforcement (i.e., V
X
will decrease). Finally, the model describes why PC
effects are stronger in the beginning of conditioning when the US/outcome is not yet expected
(cf., Mackintosh, 1983): When the US is already expected at least one of the compound
stimuli has already a high V
i
; thus, further co-occurrences/conditioning will have no effect
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).
In sum, the Rescorla-Wagner model describes PC effects like the PC phenomenon does
and moreover, is able to predict impacts of learning settings on PC effects based on
mathematical calculations. Consequently, the Rescorla-Wagner model is not able to describe
and predict EC effects and impacts of different learning settings, as different learning settings
have different impacts on EC and PC effects. As I have shown in the previous chapter, EC
effects are resistant to extinction, and there is no influence of overshadowing or blocking;
thus, the findings are contrary to predictions of the mathematical Rescorla-Wagner model.
So far, I have discussed only preference learning effects and have disentangled PC and
EC phenomena describing different learning effects. Even more interesting, however, is how
these effects are caused, that is, which processes underlie preference formation. Also the
Rescorla-Wagner model does not provide a process description of conditioning. As I pointed
out it is simply a description of PC effects. Originally the Rescorla-Wagner model was
classified as a model conceptualizing an automatic process where no cognitive reasoning is
involved. However recently, De Houwer (2009) and also Shanks (2007) pointed out that the
Rescorla-Wagner model is not incompatible with propositional reasoning processes either.
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The model specifies which input leads to which output, but it does not make any assumption
how a specific input leads to a specific output, that is, which mental processes are involved.
Yet, I assume that at least some conscious knowledge of CS-US co-occurrences and also CS
or US alone-occurrence (i.e., awareness of CS-US contingency) is necessary as contingency is
the most important prerequisite of PC and thereby of the effects described by the Rescorla-
Wagner model (cf., Martin & Levey, 1978; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). Thus, cognitive
reasoning is likely to be involved in PC. For EC it is still an open question whether EC effects
are caused by purely automatic processes or non-automatic cognitive reasoning processes.
Several process accounts all making more or less different assumptions about prerequisites
and consequences of conditioning emerged. Yet, all of these accounts have one assumption in
common: EC is a form of associative learning. In the following chapters, I will elaborate on
associative learning and describe two processes which might cause associative learning, an
automatic and a non-automatic one. Afterwards, I will provide an overview on the current EC
process accounts which assume either an automatic or non-automatic process causing EC
effects. Finally, I will discuss empirical results which shed light on processes involved.
3. Associative Learning
Associative learning is defined as a learning phenomenon where changes in beliefs or
behavior result out of changes in the world’s relations (De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell, De
Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). To emphasize again, like for PC and EC, I will refer to
associative learning as a phenomenon describing associative learning effects; these effects can
originate from miscellaneous processes. Such associative learning effects are, for example,
changes in behavior (i.e., PC effect) or changes in stimulus liking (i.e., EC effect) due to
repeated co-occurrence of specific stimuli. I do not define associative learning as a process
and thereby do not limit it to one single process. As for EC and PC, this effect definition
prevents limiting research by ensuring that research is open for different kinds of processes
which might cause the effects (see also chapter 2 and De Houwer, 2007).
There are two prevailing processes assumed to cause associative learning effects: an
automatic process including no cognitive reasoning (e.g., Thorndike, 1931) and a non-
automatic process including propositional reasoning (e.g., Brewer, 1974). Thus, thoughts and
behavior can be influenced either through the formation of simple associative links which
hold only the information that stimuli/events co-occurred (i.e., automatic process) or through
structured inferences and cognitive reasoning (i.e., propositional reasoning process) (Shanks,
2007; McLaren, Green, & Mackintosh, 1994). Both process accounts are based on different
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assumptions and make different predictions for learning effects and the influence of different
learning settings. In the next two chapters, I will provide an overview on the automatic
process account and the propositional process account. At this point I would like to point out
that other researches often refer to the automatic process as an association formation process
or a mere associative process (e.g., De Houwer, Vandrope, & Beckers, 2005; Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2006; Shanks, 2007, 2010). Thereby, they want to express that learning results
out of the formation of an associative link between two stimuli; according to this process
account this formation runs completely automatic (i.e., no influence of cognitive load,
processing goals, or awareness/conscious knowledge). The problem with using the terms
“association formation process” or “associative process” is that it indicates that only this
process is based on formation of mental links between stimuli. Yet, a propositional process
also includes the formation of mental links between stimuli. The difference, however, is that
links formed due to propositional reasoning are not mere associative holding only information
that stimuli are related. They are rather propositional links which specify how stimuli are
related; that is, propositional links are specified mental links. For example, an associative link
would be X “is associated with” A; a propositional one would be X “is a friend of” A.
Therefore, I will use the terms “automatic process” and “propositional process” to prevent this
possible confusion and emphasize the most important difference between the two process
accounts, namely automaticity.
3.1 Automatic Process
The automatic process account assumes that associative links between stimuli’s mental
representations are built and retain that those stimuli are related, that is, that they co-occur in
the environment. Thus, these links develop, for example, during conditioning procedures.
This process is stimulus-driven and completely automatic in that it is carried out without any
intention, it is unconscious, and efficient (De Houwer et al., 2005); thus, it is not influenced
by cognitive processes, processing goals, and learners do not need to be aware of stimuli co-
occurrence. Associative links formed due to this automatic process only contain information
that stimuli are related, not how. These links are sensitive to associative strength (De Houwer,
2009) which is influenced by stimuli contingency: More co-occurrences and (nearly) no
alone-occurrences of stimuli (i.e., high contingency) lead to stronger links than fewer co-
occurrences and many alone-occurrences (i.e., low contingency). According to this process
account, stimuli evaluations are automatic affective reactions resulting out of associative links
to related information which were activated as soon as respective stimuli are processed.
17
Evaluations are independent of truth values; that is, regardless of whether the activated
associative links provide valid information about the stimulus, people use those automatically
activated associations for evaluation. The activation of associative links is determined by the
existing associative structure and the external input stimuli. Thus, depending on the context
the same stimuli can activate different associative links and thereby lead to different
evaluations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).
The conceptualization of associative links between stimulus representations, whose
strength is alterable, provides an intuitive analogy to neural networks (see De Houwer, 2009;
Mitchell et al., 2009). Once a stimulus occurs activation automatically spreads via associative
links and activates other stimulus representations. However, Shanks (2007) argued that
process accounts only incorporating unspecified mental links between stimulus
representations, like the automatic process account, are severely limited. These associative
links do only contain information that stimuli are related; they do not consider how stimuli are
related. Consequently, an automatic process including only unspecified mental links would
predict no difference in evaluations based on different information like “John teased Marry”
or “Marry teased John” (cf., Shanks, 2007, p. 294), although absolutely different meanings are
implied. However, a process which assumes the formation of specified mental links, that is,
propositional links that include information how stimuli or events are related in the
environment would predict differences in evaluation depending on different relational
information. When specified propositional information is available and considered, the
probability for adequate evaluation (e.g., John is disliked as he teased Marry or Marry is
disliked as she teased John) will grow. However, it is extremely important to note that this
does not automatically imply that adequate evaluations are always caused by a cognitive
process incorporating propositional links. There might be situations or learning contexts
where an automatic process influences learning and causes adequate evaluations, too.
Moreover, finding evidence for a propositional process does not automatically exclude the
possibility of automatic processes causing the same effects.
3.2 Propositional Process
According to Brewer (1974, p. 1), “conditioning in human subjects is produced through
the operation of higher mental processes”. That is, controlled (i.e., intentional, conscious, and
effortful) processing leads to associative learning and thereby to beliefs about the world (De
Houwer et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 2009). A propositional approach comprises that
associative learning effects depend on the formation and evaluation of propositions, and non-
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automatic processes are involved (De Houwer, 2009). Consequently, the process leads to
conscious and propositional knowledge about events (Mitchell et al., 2009).
Before I elaborate any further on the process itself, it is important to clarify what is
meant by a proposition. According to Shanks (2007, p. 294) a proposition has an “internal
semantic or propositional structure in the same way as language does.” It consists of two
stimuli linked through a propositional link which is a qualified mental link, including
information about how those stimuli are related (thus, capturing the different meanings of the
statements “John teased Marry” or “Marry teased John”). Those propositions imply a truth
value; that is, as they include specified relational information they can be true or false (De
Houwer, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2009). When, for example, an observer forms the proposition
“John likes Marry” after seeing that John repeatedly teased Marry this proposition is false.
According to De Houwer, a new proposition (e.g., John is an enemy of Marry) will only be
evaluated as true when it is consistent with other existing propositions which are regarded as
being true (e.g., John dislikes Marry; John teases Marry). Existing propositions can stem from
prior knowledge, experience, deductive reasoning, and also mere instructions (De Houwer,
2009). Associative learning effects depend on the propositions considered to be relevant for
respective stimuli/events and the propositions’ truth values. When other propositions are
considered to be relevant at a certain moment and thus different propositions are taken into
account, while evaluating a stimulus, evaluations or behavior can vary over time (Gawronski
& Bodenhausen, 2006).
As already stated, a propositional process includes non-automatic processes.
Summarized by De Houwer (2009), this means that people need to be input-aware (they
recognize that objects co-occur and in what way) and output-aware (they are aware of the
proposition about the objects’ relation). They do not need to be aware of the process which
led to the proposition formation and truth evaluation. That is, associative learning effects only
emerge when people have conscious knowledge that stimuli have a certain relation in the
world. This knowledge can only form when people recognize and encode that stimuli co-
occur and how they are related. Therefore, sufficient cognitive resources need to be available,
people need time to initiate and end the reasoning process, and specific goals related to the
process exist (De Houwer, 2009). It is however important to note that, although learning is
non-automatic, some processes involved in learning can be automatic; that is, automatic
processes, like memory retrieval or stimuli perception, can provide input for non-automatic
propositional reasoning. Thus, already formed and truth evaluated propositions can be stored
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in memory and automatically influence evaluation and behavior in the future (Mitchell et al.,
2009).
Especially in recent years, a propositional process explanation of associative learning
has become popular. Even findings which were considered to be explained by an automatic
process were reconsidered and explained by propositional reasoning processes (for further
clarifications see De Houwer, 2009; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2009). Yet,
there are several reasons why one should be cautious in concluding that associative learning
effects are caused only by a propositional process: First, findings supporting a propositional
account in one learning setting do not imply that automatic processes cannot cause associative
learning effects in other learning settings. Second, it can never be excluded that at least some
automatic processes run while propositional processes run during learning. Third, also
unspecified mental links, that is, associative links that were built in an automatic process can
be taken into account when evaluating stimuli within a propositional process; that is, both
processes would provide information for evaluation.
In the next chapter, I will discuss theoretical approaches to an EC process and allocate
these process approaches to either an automatic or a propositional process approach. Further, I
will provide and discuss empirical findings shedding light onto the EC process. Finally, based
on the considerations concerning the possibility of excluding one or the other process based
on empirical findings, I will discuss implications for an EC process and the possibility of
multiple EC processes.
4. Theoretical Approaches to Evaluative Conditioning
Basically there are five theoretical accounts assuming more or less different EC
processes (see also Hofmann et al., 2010). On the one hand, there are theoretical accounts
which assume an automatic process causing EC effects: The holistic account (Martin &
Levey, 1978, 1994) assumes that co-occurrences of CS and US result in a holistic
representation, encoding CS and US as a stimulus complex which is linked to another
stimulus complex of CR and UCR. When a CS is presented after conditioning it works as a
weaker form of the US leading to the evaluative response. This approach would predict that a
holistic representation will only be formed, thus EC effects only occur when there is some
kind of content or feature similarity between CS and US. Further, in this view CS-US
contingency is not necessary, only CS-US contiguity is relevant; that is, CS and US need to
repeatedly co-occur, but it does not matter whether both also occur alone. Thus, this account
predicts that EC is resistant to extinction. Moreover, people do not need conscious knowledge
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(be aware) of CS-US contiguity as perception and encoding of stimuli is based on automatic
processes. Finally, CS valence is influenced by US-revaluation; that is, when US valence will
change after conditioning, CS valence changes accordingly as each US presentation
automatically activates the associated CS representation and thereby changes the holistic
representation. At the first place, predictions of no extinction and sensitivity to US-
revaluation seem contradicting: The holistic account predicts that there will be no extinction
of EC effects as only contiguity but not contingency is relevant; thus, alone-occurrences of
CS/US do not have any influence. This would imply that EC effects do not rely on associative
links between CSs and USs which otherwise will diminished during extinction phases. The
prediction of US-revaluation influences, however, implies that there is an associative link
between CS and US. The account solves this contradiction by assuming not only an
associative link between CS and US but rather associative links between CS, US, CR, and
UCR forming a holistic representation. Only this holistic representation allows for predicting,
on the one hand, resistance to extinction as CSs are linked directly to CR and, on the other
hand, US-revaluation influences as CSs are also linked to USs. The referential account
(Baeyens et al., 1992a) postulates the learning of referential relations; CSs are associated with
USs representations and the evaluative response to the US without US expectancy. That is,
after the CS the US is not expected, yet, US evaluation is activated. The account predicts that
only CS-US contiguity is necessary, not CS-US contingency; yet, people do not need to be
aware of the contiguity (i.e., they do not need any conscious knowledge of co-occurrences).
As there is no expectancy of the US caused by the CS, extinction and blocking should have no
impact on EC effects. Finally, US-revaluation would impact CS valence as CS and US are
linked in memory and US presentation in a US-revaluation phase also activates and changes
CS representation. The implicit misattribution account (Jones, Fazio, & Olson, 2009) posits
that US valence is incorrectly attributed to the CS; people assume that the evaluative source
lies within the CS. The misattributed valence is activated when the CS occurs alone
afterwards, thus, EC should be resistant to extinction. The account predicts that misattribution
will only happen if CS and US features overlap and if it is plausible that the activated US
valence might have been caused by the CS. And finally, awareness of CS-US contiguity is not
necessary, but rather impairs misattribution as the US would be clearly identified as the
valence source. These three accounts share the assumption of an automatic EC process where
people need not be aware of CS-US contiguity. The accounts’ main prerequisite is CS-US
contiguity and not contingency. They assume that unspecified mental links (i.e., associative
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links) are formed between CS and US representations, or between CS and evaluative response
to the US.
The propositional account (De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2009) assumes that the
liking or disliking of a CS changes depending on propositional information about CS and US
relations (e.g., CS occurs with/is friend with US). Thus, a propositional EC process account
assumes a non-automatic, cognitive reasoning process which includes the formation and truth
evaluation of propositions. CS-US contiguity is a central prerequisite of the propositional
process and people need to be aware of CS-US contiguity to form propositions. In addition, I
assume that people also need to be aware of relational information additionally available, as
different relations imply different meanings and thereby moderate EC effects (cf., Fiedler &
Unkelbach, 2011; Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011b). As cognitive reasoning processes are
involved, this account further predicts that cognitive load reduces conditioning, and also that
conditioning might be influenced by verbal instruction and deductive reasoning. This
propositional EC account equals a propositional process causing associative learning effects
described earlier.
A fifth account, the conceptual categorization account (Davey, 1994; Field & Davey,
1999), assumes that co-occurrences of stimuli make shared features of CS and US salient; as a
consequence, the CS is re-categorized either as an exemplar of the “liked” or “disliked”
category depending on the US valence. The account assumes that EC effects only arise when
CS and US are similar, and that because of this similarity CS-US contiguity is not even
necessary. Thus, when USs’ liked and disliked categories are already easily accessible, CSs
will be categorized as members of the category they share most features with. The conceptual
categorization account predicts that EC effects are resistant to extinction due to the fact that
CSs after conditioning are members of the liked/disliked category and, thus, activate valence
on their own. US-revaluation might influence CS valence as it leads to a criteria change of the
liked/disliked categories; and these changed criteria are applied to CSs which might be re-
categorized again. This account cannot clearly be assigned to an automatic or propositional
process approach: The CS could be linked to the liked/disliked category representation by an
associative link (caused by an automatic process); or a cognitive reasoning process could lead
to the re-categorization through a proposition like “CS is an example of the liked/disliked
category because CS and US are similar” (resembling a propositional process).
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4.1 Empirical Findings Concerning the EC Process.
As stated earlier, the core difference between an automatic process account and a
propositional process account is automaticity (see De Houwer, 2009). Automatic process
accounts assume associative learning to run automatically; that is, associative learning effects
emerge without awareness (of CS-US contiguity, and in- or output of the process) and the
underlying process is not influenced by processing goals or limited cognitive resources.
Propositional process accounts, however, assume associative learning to run non-
automatically; that is, cognitive components like awareness, goals, and resources influence
the process and thereby evaluative and behavioral effects. Thus, studies trying to examine
processes causing EC effects examined the influence of awareness, processing goals, and
limited resources on EC effects. Earlier EC studies provided evidence for an automatic
process: EC effects seemed to occur without participants being aware of CS-US contiguity
(e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990; Walther, 2002), and even when participants’
cognitive resources were low due to distraction tasks EC effects emerged (e.g., Fulcher &
Hammerl, 2001).
However, Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, and Yzerbyt (2007) pointed out some limitations
of earlier studies: Some studies used questionable designs where CSs and USs were assigned
by the experimenter (i.e., not randomized or counterbalanced) and thus allow no assumption
about processes involved (see also Field & Davey, 1999; Lovibond and Shanks, 2002). Other
studies implemented better experimental designs (e.g., like randomized CS-US allocation) but
used insufficient measures for awareness which did not conform to the information and
sensitivity criterion
2
established by Shanks and St. John (1994). Thus, for some studies it is
not clear whether measures captured CS-US contiguity awareness or demand awareness; or if
the measures implementing open questions or free recalls were sensitive enough to measure
awareness for all participants (see Shanks & St. John, 2004). And finally, analyzing methods
further added on the sensitivity issue by using participant-based analyses. That is, participants
were classified as either aware or unaware when they could or could not identify a certain
number of CS-US pairs. Yet, it is highly unlikely that participants were either aware or
unaware of all pairs; thus, classifying them biases the results. Therefore, Pleyers and
colleagues recommended an item-based analysis deciding for each CS-US pair whether a
participant was aware or not and analyzing data on an item-basis afterwards.
2
Information criterion = information measured by the awareness measure resembles the information which
caused performance
Sensitivity criterion = measurement is sensitive enough to capture awareness
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In recent years, studies using appropriate experimental designs and item-based analyses
of awareness data provided growing evidence that EC is indeed affected by awareness of CS-
US contiguity, processing goals, and resources; hence, supporting a propositional EC process.
Overall, the meta-analysis by Hofmann and colleagues (2010) showed that CS-US contiguity
awareness is the most influential moderator of EC effects. Thus, not only Pleyers and
colleagues (2007) provided evidence that awareness is essential for EC effects, but also Stahl
and Unkelbach (2009) and Stahl, Unkelbach, and Corneille (2009) showed that people need to
be able to remember at least the valence of the paired US (i.e., be valence aware), to name
only some examples. Additionally, Wardle, Mitchell, and Lovibond (2007) showed that
awareness is also necessary for EC of other stimulus modalities, like flavors. Also, for the
influence of the other two components of non-automatic processes (i.e., processing goals and
cognitive resources) empirical support was provided: Gast and Rothermund (2011) showed
that changes in valence, that is, EC effects only emerged if participants had a valence focus. If
participants focused their attention to other stimulus dimensions no EC effects emerged.
Further, Corneille, Yzerbyt, Pleyers, and Mussweiler (2009) showed that EC effects were
stronger when participants had the goal to search for similarities in CSs and USs. And
Dedonder, Corneille, Yzerbyt, and Kuppens (2010) showed that EC effects were weaker or
did not even occur when participants’ cognitive resources were low because of a demanding
secondary task during conditioning, thus preventing contiguity awareness (see also Pleyers,
Corneille, Yzerbyt, and Luminet, 2009). Also, Field and Moore (2005) found EC effects only
for people fully attending to the conditioning task; people whose attention was bound by a
distractor task showed no conditioning effects. These findings led to the conclusion that
effortful non-automatic processes are indeed necessary for EC effects to occur and thus
propositional reasoning is most likely. Consequently so far, the propositional account (De
Houwer, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2009) and also the conceptual categorization account (Davey,
1994; Field & Davey, 1999) would account for the results if we assume a propositional
reasoning process involved in the re-categorization of CSs.
Recently, a study by Fiedler and Unkelbach (2011) provided results which can only be
explained by a propositional reasoning process: Reversed EC effects depending on relational
information for CSs and USs. They used a standard EC procedure and repeatedly paired
pictures of neutral men (CSs) and liked/disliked men (USs). During conditioning, they also
provided information about the CS-US relation by telling participants the men were either
friends or enemies. Results showed that initially neutral CSs were liked more/less when they
were friends with liked/disliked USs (i.e., standard EC effects). However, when CSs were
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enemies of liked USs, they were liked less; and when CSs were enemies of disliked USs, they
were liked more (i.e., reversed EC effects). Yet, Fiedler and Unkelbach found these effects
only when participants engaged in active encoding, like rating how likely it was that the two
men were friends (respectively enemies) during conditioning. When participants only
passively received information about the CS-US relation no reversed EC effects emerged
(Exp. 4). Fiedler and Unkelbach concluded that not only pure bottom-up processes
(processing US valence), but also effortful top-down processes (active generation and
encoding of CS-US relations) are involved in causing EC effects. Furthermore, they assumed
that repeated pairing of two stimuli commonly result in standard EC effects (CS paired with
positive US is liked) when no additional relational information is provided. As there is a
default assimilation schema, people form assimilative/positive relations between CS and US
(e.g., predicts, co-occur, are friends). Only when divergent information is provided through
relational information (e.g., prevents, are enemies) this additional information is taken into
account and reconsidered leading to reversed EC effects.
Hence again, support was provided for a propositional EC process as it considers
cognitive reasoning influencing EC effects and only propositional links capture information
about how CS and US are related. Automatic process accounts (i.e., referential, holistic,
misattribution accounts) cannot explain the reversed effects as in their vision the reasoning
process would not take place; thus the information about CS-US relation (how they are
related) would not be processed.
The conceptual categorization account (Davey, 1994; Field & Davey, 1999) might
explain Fielder and Unkelbach’s results only if we assume the following: This account would
only predict reversed EC effects, when CSs linked to USs with negative relations like “is
enemy of” were categorized as members of the opposite category of the paired USs. However,
negative relations are not unambiguously informative. Thus, it is not completely conclusive
that an enemy of a disliked US is automatically categorized as an exemplar of the liked
category; the enemy could be an exemplar of another disliked subcategory. Thus, I assume
that findings of reversed EC effects can only be explained by a propositional EC account.
Moreover, feature similarity of CSs and USs would be necessary for the categorization
process (Davey, 1994; Field & Davey, 1999), which was given in Fielder and Unkelbach’s
research using human CSs and USs. However, feature similarity was not given in the study by
Förderer and Unkelbach (2011b) reported next, providing evidence for standard and reversed
EC effects caused by a propositional process.
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4.2 EC Effects Depend on CS-US Relations (Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011b)
In a recently published study, we showed how relational qualifier, which are words
providing information about CS-US relations, moderate EC effects; that is, how specified
relational information moderated whether standard or reversed EC effects emerged (Förderer
& Unkelbach, 2011b). Therefore, human CSs were repeatedly paired with valenced animal or
landscape USs manipulated between-participants including either positive or negative
relations (i.e., CS loves/loathes US). Comparable to Fiedler and Unkelbach (2011), standard
EC effects emerged when CSs loved USs: A man (CS) loving a liked kitten (US+) was liked
more after repeated pairings; a man loving a disliked pit-bull (US-) was liked less.
Conversely, when CSs loathed USs reversed EC effects emerged: A man loathing a liked
kitten (US+) was disliked and a man loathing a disliked pit-bull (US-) was liked. Interesting
about these findings was that standard and reversed EC effects emerged when participants
passively received relational information, which was contrary to Fiedler and Unkelbach’s
findings where reversed EC effects only emerged when participants actively engaged in the
encoding process. However, there is a problem regarding the design used by Fiedler and
Unkelbach: They manipulated relational information (friend or enemy) between-participants
which made the information less salient and, thus, information might not have been processed
and encoded when participants only passively received it. In contrast, we manipulated
relational information (loves or loathes) within-subjects making it highly salient and
informative (see Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011b). This supports my prior assumption that
people need not only be aware of CS-US contiguity but also need to be aware of relational
information, respectively how CS and US are related for accurate evaluation. If people are not
aware of the relational information, respectively if they do not have any knowledge about how
stimuli are related, only standard EC effects emerge. Thus in Experiment 4 in Fiedler and
Unkelbach’s study, the standard EC effects, which emerged for CS-US pairs presented with
“is friend with” but also with “is enemy of”, could have been caused by an automatic
processes which took only CS-US contiguity but did not take knowledge about the type of
CS-US relation into account. As the relational information was not salient because of the
between-participant manipulation, no propositional processes were triggered, which otherwise
might have caused reversed EC effects for CSs being enemies of USs.
Our study provides support for a propositional EC account and shows the moderating
role of relational information. Only a propositional process (De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell et al.,
2009) can cause reversed EC effects as it includes cognitive reasoning taking CS-US relations
into account. Considering how CS and US are related influences the direction of EC effects.
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Automatic process accounts might only be able to explain these results if we consider
excitatory (when CS loves US) and inhibitory (when CS loathes US) associative links
between CS and US representations. However, we assumed this to be rather unlikely: To
predict reversed EC effects on the basis of an automatic process, one needs to assume that
inhibitory links between CSs and positive USs lead to the activation of negative valence; and
that inhibitory links between CSs and negative USs lead to the activation of positive valence
(Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011b). However, this is not consequential as one might rather
assume neutral/no valence to be activated by an inhibitory link to a valenced representation
(see chapter 2.2). Moreover, even if inhibitory links activate opposite valence of the US it is
unlikely to assume that inhibitory links to negative USs activate equally strong positive
valence as excitatory links to positive US (see Unkelbach et al., 2008 on valence
asymmetries); however, this is the case in our absolutely symmetrical data pattern (Förderer
& Unkelbach, 2011b).
Also, the conceptual categorization account (Davey, 1994; Field & Davey, 1999) cannot
account for our results, as the basic assumption of feature similarity in CSs and USs is not
given as human CSs and animal/landscape USs are used. It would be rather unlikely that
pairing human CSs with animal/landscape USs highlights common features of the stimuli and
consequently leads participants to re-categorize human CSs as exemplars of a liked or disliked
animal/landscape US category. Moreover analogous to the argument I made in the discussion
of Fielder and Unkelbach’s study, negative relations are less informative than positive
relations. Thus, a CS loathing something the participant dislikes (negative US) is not
automatically categorized as liked. The CS might also loathe other things the participant likes
and is consequently disliked by the participant.
Independent of existing EC accounts, one might argue that Heider’s Balance Theory
(1946) provides an alternative explanation for our results. According to Balance Theory, a
triad is balanced when there are either three positive or one positive and two negative
relations between the triad’s components. People strive for balanced triads as unbalanced ones
lead to motivational strain. Concerning our study, a triad would include the participant, the
CS, and the US. When a participant dislikes a CS because this CS loathes a US the participant
likes (US+), this represents not only a reversed EC effect but also a balanced triad (i.e., one
positive and two negative relations). Thus, all standard and reversed EC effects in our study
are based on balanced triads and Balance Theory explains the findings. However, we rather
see Balance Theory as a particular type of a propositional model, instead of an alternative
explanation: It assumes that information about the relation of the triad’s components mediate
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the change of stimulus valence. That is, the theory explains how different propositions (e.g.,
participant dislikes negative US and CS likes negative US) lead to a new proposition about
the CS likeability (e.g., participant disliked CS). Thus, we are certain that our results resemble
standard and reversed EC effects which are caused due to a propositional reasoning process
and, consequently, can only be explained by a propositional EC process.
4.3 Conclusions on the EC Process Debate
Can the debate about the EC process be closed? Is the propositional process put forward
by De Houwer (2009) and Mitchell and colleagues (2009) the one and only process causing
standard and reversed EC effects? Based on the findings on moderating factors of EC so far
one might say yes. Especially the findings on the necessity of contiguity awareness for EC
effects built the fundamental groundwork for the assumption of a propositional process. When
sensitive and informative awareness measures and analyses were used (cf., Pleyers et al.,
2007) results showed that EC effects can only emerge when people were aware of CS-US
contiguity (e.g., Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009; Stahl et al., 2009; Wardle at al., 2007). Moreover,
the negative influence of reduced cognitive resources (Field & Moore, 2005; Dedonder et al.,
2010) and the moderation through processing goals (Corneille et al., 2009) can only be
explained by a propositional process relying on cognitive resources and information input. An
automatic process, however, would be resistant to those influences; it would still cause EC
effects even when cognitive resources were low or people had no contiguity awareness.
Finally, reversed EC effects due to negative CS-US relations (Fiedler & Unkelbach, 2011;
Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011b) can only be caused by a propositional reasoning process
influenced by bottom-up (perceiving US valence and relational information) and top-down
processes (considering and encoding relational information).
However, the notion of a singular propositional process causing EC effects was recently
challenged by a study of Hütter, Sweldens, Stahl, Unkelbach, and Klauer (in press)
implementing a new awareness measure and providing evidence for EC that occurs without
awareness. They subscribed to Pleyers and colleagues’ (2007) argumentation on prior
findings of EC effects without awareness arguing that these findings cannot be taken as clear
evidence due to methodological issues. However, they also criticized awareness measures
used in studies that showed that participants need to be aware of US valence for EC effects to
emerge (e.g., Stahl et al., 2009). According to Hütter and colleagues these awareness
measures were influenced by inferences based on conditioned valence; that is, when
participants cannot correctly identify US valence, they might rely on the conditioned CS
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valence and consequently infer US valence. Thus, correct USs valence will be identified for
successfully conditioned CSs leading to the assumption that EC effects only emerge when
participants are aware of US valence. To disentangle pure valence awareness and the
influence of CS valence and provide conclusive evidence for the influence of awareness,
Hütter and colleagues used a process dissociation approach. They implemented a new
awareness measure which enabled them to calculate separate parameters for pure awareness,
inferences based on CS valence, and guessing. Results showed that indeed EC effects without
awareness of US valence emerged. Thereby, Hütter and colleagues challenged the most
important empirical indication for a propositional process, that is, the absolute necessity of
awareness. EC that occurs outside of awareness rather speaks for an automatic process which
does not depend on cognitive processing of CS-US contiguity.
Adding to the controversy about the necessity of awareness Field and Moore (2005)
provided evidence that it is not awareness but rather attention to CS-US contiguity which is
necessary for EC effects to emerge. Only when participants fully attended to the conditioning
procedure, EC effects emerged independent of whether participants were aware of CS-US
contiguity or not. Further, they showed that not only EC effects were influenced by attention
to the conditioning procedure, but also that awareness was influenced (i.e., when there was no
attention, awareness was low). Hence, results showed that third factors can influence
awareness as well as EC effects. Thus, awareness is not a prerequisite of conditioning but
rather a side effect of attention which in turn is a prerequisite of EC. The lack of attention
could also explain why EC effects are impaired by low cognitive resources, respectively
focusing ones attention to distracting tasks, or by distracting processing goals. If people do
not attend to the stimuli and the evaluative tasks it is likely that no EC effects emerge.
Therefore, the answer to the original question whether only a propositional process
causes EC effects is open again. If one considers the recent findings of Hütter and colleagues
about unaware EC supporting an automatic process on the one hand, in combination with
findings about the influence of cognitive load, processing goals, and relational qualifier
supporting a propositional process on the other, a dual-process model seems most likely to
explain all findings (see also Hütter et al., in press). Already Lovibond and Shanks (2002; also
De Houwer et al., 2005; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) considered the possibility of a
dual-process model which includes automatic as well as propositional processes. A dual-
process model assumes that an automatic process which does not rely on awareness, as well
as effortful propositional reasoning which relies on awareness can both cause EC effects.
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Based on the controversial findings, I assume that automatic as well as propositional
processes cause EC effects. Even findings of EC effects which can only be explained by one
process (e.g., reversed EC effects due to negative CS-US relation) do not automatically
exclude that the other process causes EC effects under different conditions. And as one can
never utterly control that only one process runs at a time, experimental manipulations (e.g.,
cognitive load) can only increase or decrease the likelihood of the activation of one process or
the other. Yet, I would avoid speaking of a “dual-process model” as this leads to some
theoretical problems: First, using the term “dual-process” implies one already knows that
exactly two processes cause EC effects. This limits research as other possible processes also
causing EC effects might be excluded by default. Second, speaking of a model would imply
one knows which process works under which conditions. So far, there are only some hints
about moderating factors (e.g., awareness, cognitive resources, relational information) yet no
final conclusion could be made. Finally, it would also imply that only one process can work at
a time excluding the other process in return. I rather speak of a multiple-process account of
which we know the following so far: First, automatic as well as propositional processes cause
EC effects. If people have enough cognitive resources, a goal of processing and evaluating the
provided information of CS-US contiguity, and a focus of their attention on CS-US
contiguity, it is very likely that they engage in propositional reasoning processes. Yet, there
are circumstances where EC effects emerge even when cognitive resources are low or people
are not aware of CS-US contiguity. Second, when information about CS-US relations is
salient people engage in a propositional process and reversed EC effects emerge. If this
relational information is not salient it is rather likely that mere automatic processes cause only
standard EC effects independent of the CS-US relation. Further research has to show which
other learning settings determine which process runs and which external factors, like
attention, determine whether EC effects emerge or not.
5. Beyond Valence: Non-Evaluative Conditioning
So far, research using EC procedures only considered valence changes in neutral
stimuli. However, preferences are far more complex than just positive or negative, liked or
disliked. We rather hold specific images of people, objects, or brands in our minds; they are
associated with specific attributes beyond mere valence. Thus for example, a brand might be
associated with athletic, smart, and sexy. So the question is: How do people, objects, or
brands acquire these attributes? Is it just overall positive valence associated with an athletic
person (US) that is conditioned to a neutral other person (CS) (resembling an EC effect)? And
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does this lead to a high evaluation of the initially neutral person on all positive attributes? The
question is if the person (CS) is associated with attributes like athletic, sexy, and smart as they
are all positive. Or are only specific attributes conditioned beyond valence?
Process accounts about EC do not make any assertion about the change in associated
attributes in addition to changes in valence through EC procedures. Yet, they also do not limit
the phenomenon to result in valence changes only. Thus, I assumed that simple EC
procedures can also lead to changes in associated attributes when CSs co-occur with USs
which are associated with prominent attributes. That is, mere spatial and temporal contiguity
of a neutral CS and a US representing a specific attribute is sufficient to associate the CS with
this attribute. This is what I call non-evaluative conditioning (NEC). Prior research also uses
terms like associative transfer of non-evaluative stimulus properties (Meersmans, De Houwer,
Baeyens, Randell, & Eelen, 2005), associative learning of non-evaluative co-variations
(Olson, Kendrick, & Fazio, 2009), and semantic conditioning (Galli & Gorn, 2011) to refer to
the same phenomenon. Of course all attributes are associated with some kind of valence;
especially attributes associated with brands conveyed in ads are commonly associated with a
strong positive valence. Yet, by using the term non-evaluative conditioning I refer to the fact
that attributes are associated with CSs over and above valence. Thus, it is not only a diffuse
positive feeling associated with a CS resulting in high ratings on all positive attributes, but in
fact an association of a specific attribute.
So far, evidence of NEC is mixed: Successful conditioning of attributes was shown by
Kim, Allen, and Kardes (1996). They made a tissue brand (CS) seem to have softer tissues by
repeatedly showing it together with kittens (soft USs); and a pizza delivery (CS) seemed to
deliver faster after pairing it with racing cars (fast USs). Galli and Gorn (2011) conditioned
fake brands (CSs) by subliminally pairing them with the words “black” or “white” (USs).
Results of a lexical-decision task showed that the brands were associated with the non-
evaluative attributes “black/white”. However, Meersmans and colleagues (2005) found
conditioning effects of “gender” to baby or Kanji (Chinese characters) CSs only in four out of
eight experiments. In Experiment 2 and 6, babies (CSs) repeatedly shown with clearly male
faces (USs) were rather thought to be a boy than a girl (and vice versa for CSs shown with
female USs). Yet in Experiment 6, this was only true for pairings participants were aware of.
In Experiment 7 and 8, gender was conditioned to Kanji only when participants were aware of
the pairings; and only in Experiment 7 the effects were found on an indirect priming measure.
Olson and colleagues (2009) failed to condition the attributes “size” and “speed”; they only
found an effect on size when it was primed before conditioning in Experiment 2. They argued
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that non-evaluative attributes need to be highlighted prior to conditioning as they are less
salient than valence. Yet, I think it was rather a design problem as they used lots of filler
stimuli in the conditioning phase and a dual task situation. Thus, reduced cognitive-resources,
low attention to CS-US pairs, and low awareness might have caused the lack of effects (cf.,
Pleyers et al., 2009; Field & Moore, 2005).
Besides the sparse and inconsistent findings concerning changing attribute associations
through conditioning, the reported effects could have resulted out of an inference process
based on valence: None of the reported studies did consider whether the differences in
attribute ratings were really caused by a change in associated attributes or by a mere change in
valence. For example, female faces are liked more than male faces (e.g., Rhodes, 2006). Thus,
when baby CSs were presented with a female US the positive valence of the female face
might have been associated with the baby. Afterwards when participants were asked whether
the baby is a boy or a girl, they infer the gender based on their positive feeling about the baby
and rate it to be a girl (and vice versa for babies paired with male faces). Thus, there was no
unambiguous prove for changes in associated attributes, respectively non-evaluative
conditioning beyond valence.
5.1 Beyond EC! Evidence for Transfer of Non-Evaluative Attributes (Förderer & Unkelbach,
2011a)
To provide first evidence for NEC beyond valence we conditioned the attribute
“athleticism” to different kinds of neutral CSs and controlled for valence statistically
(Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011a). In Experiment 1-3, portraits of men (CSs) repeatedly co-
occurred with athletic or non-athletic men (USs); consequently, participants rated men co-
occurring with athletic men more athletic than men co-occurring with non-athletic others. By
conditioning athleticism to neutral shapes and non-words, Experiment 4 showed that NEC is
not limited to human CSs but is a general associative learning phenomenon. Although CSs
did not differ in likeability ratings (except for Experiment 4), we controlled for valence
influences statistically in all four experiments by predicting athleticism ratings based on
likeability ratings. We redid the original analyses using the regression residuals which were
now adjusted for valence. These analyses showed that the NEC effects were still present and,
thus, were indeed caused by athleticism associated with the CSs and not by inferences based
on valence which was probably associated with the CSs.
NEC effects were also found on indirect measures: Experiment 1, 2, and 4 used a
semantic misattribution procedure (SMP, cf., Imhoff, Schmidt, Bernhardt, Dierksmeier, &
32
Banse, 2010; which is a modified version of the AMP by Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart,
2005) where participants indicated that Kanji following athletic CSs represent a word with an
athletic meaning more often than Kanji following non-athletic CSs. Thus, CSs’ athleticism
was misattributed to neutral Kanji which indicates that CSs were indeed associated with
athletic/non-athletic. Experiment 3 replicated the effects on a semantic priming measure (cf.,
McNamara, 2005) where participants responded faster to congruent trials (e.g., athletic CS-
prime followed by athletic target) than to incongruent trials. By finding NEC effects not only
on direct but also on indirect measures, we are certain that effects were not influenced by
demand awareness of participants during measurement. It is unlikely that participants saw a
CS for some milliseconds in a SMP, remembered whether it was paired with an athletic or
non-athletic USs, inferred which response the experimenter expects, and rated the Kanji
accordingly (or responded faster in congruent trials than in incongruent ones in the semantic
priming).
The careful reader might have realized that, in the current work, I refer to NEC effects
as changes in attribute associations for CSs, while we referred to NEC effects as attribute
transfer in the reported article (Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011a). However, the term “attribute
transfer” could be misleading as attributes per se cannot be changed by conditioning. Only the
perceiver’s impression of a person or object can be influenced by NEC as these impressions
are based on attributes perceivers associate with people or objects. Therefore, I used terms
like “changing attribute associations” through NEC procedures in the current work and in the
following study (Förderer & Unkelbach, under review).
In this first study, only one attribute was conditioned and USs were selected based on a
pre-test to be clearly represent the attribute “athleticism”. As a follow-up, we conducted
another study conditioning several attributes at a time and using celebrities associated with
several attributes. Moreover, we will show that specific NEC can be managed. That is, we
will show that by emphasizing specific USs’ attributes CSs will be associated with only these
attributes even is USs represent multiple attributes.
5.2 Non-evaluative conditioning of specific attributes with multi-attribute US (Förderer &
Unkelbach, under review)
In the prior study, we provided first empirical support for NEC beyond valence
(Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011a); yet, we conditioned only one attribute by using clearly
athletic and clearly non-athletic USs. Moreover, we only measured changes in athleticism and
likeability. To show that NEC is a general phenomenon able to change specific attribute
33
associations we ran a second series of experiments conditioning distinct attributes in one
conditioning phase (Förderer & Unkelbach, under review). We intended to show that only
specific attributes of USs will be associated with paired CSs; and that the CSs will not be
associated with other also positive attributes. Moreover, we intended to show that even if USs
represent multiple attributes (i.e., multi-attribute USs), it is possible to control which of these
attributes will be associated with paired CSs.
In Experiment 1 and 2, we conditioned five neutral logos (CSs) by repeatedly pairing
them with celebrities (USs) each representing one of five attributes: humorous, sexy,
educated, athletic, or soft. After conditioning, logo CSs were rated higher on the attribute
associated with the celebrity US they were paired with than the other CSs were, that is, basic
NEC effects emerged. For example, the humorous conditioned logo was rated higher on
humorous than the other logos were. Moreover, logo CSs were rated higher on the attribute
associated with the US they were paired with, than on all other attributes, that is what we call
specific NEC effects. For example, the humorous conditioned logo was rated higher on
humorous than on all other attributes. Thereby, results showed that it is possible to condition
specific attributes within one session. Although all attributes were positive in valence,
participants rated CSs high only on the attribute associated with the paired USs, instead of
rating them high on all positive attributes based on a general positive feeling about the CSs. It
is intriguing that participants clearly recognized the attribute a celebrity US represented from
a head and shoulder picture of the celebrity; therefor it was not even necessary providing them
with several exemplars representing one attribute. That is, results showed no important
difference in NEC effects when CSs were paired with either one celebrity US or three
celebrity USs representing the same attribute. Experiment 2 showed that conditioned
attributes persist over time as there was no difference in NEC effects measured immediately
after conditioning or one/two days later. A short conditioning phase was sufficient to form
persistent associations/preferences.
In Experiment 1 and 2, celebrity USs were chosen based on pre-test data to represent
only one attribute. Yet, when one thinks of entities like celebrities representing attributes it is
rather unlikely that they are associated with only one specific attribute. Someone like George
Clooney might be associated with being charming, sexy, and smart. Thus, we conducted
Experiment 3 testing how different attributes associated with a celebrity US can be
conditioned; that is, how NEC can be controlled. Therefore, we used a priming procedure (cf.,
Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977) to accentuate different celebrity attributes prior to
conditioning. For each celebrity US either an easily accessible dominant (e.g., for Jolie sexy)
34
or a less accessible, but also known non-dominant attribute (e.g., for Jolie familial) was
primed. Results showed that when the dominant attribute was primed, logo CSs were rated
high on the dominant, but not on the other attributes. When the non-dominant attribute was
primed logos were rated high on the non-dominant, but also on the not primed dominant
attribute. It is important to note that in the dominant-priming condition the dominant attribute
was rated much higher than in the non-dominant-priming condition; thus, attribute priming
had an effect in both conditions. Consequently, by using simple priming procedures prior to
conditioning it is possible to manage NEC and to control which attributes will be associated
with CSs even if it were less accessible non-dominant ones. However, one has to keep in
mind that dominant attributes readily associated with USs will always be associated with
paired CSs.
An interesting difference of this study and prior NEC studies is that in prior studies
USs were clearly opposed on the to-be-conditioned attribute. Meersmans and colleagues
(2005), for example, used male and female USs; we used clearly athletic or non-athletic USs
(Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011a). This has accentuated the attributes gender and athleticism
which should be conditioned, as these were the primarily distinguishing variables between
USs presented in the conditioning phase. In Experiment 1 and 2 of the current study, USs
were not opposed on the attributes in question; they were rather strongly associated with one
of several attributes (according to the pre-test). Thus, it is very intriguing that participants
made such differentiated CSs ratings which showed that indeed the specific attribute of a US
was associated with the paired CS. We assumed that the conditioning context, that is, the
stimuli present during conditioning determine which attributes will primarily distinguish
between USs. Consequently, this primarily distinguishing attributes will be conditioned as
participants’ focus is drawn to these attributes. This argumentation is in line with assumptions
of Gast and Rothermund (2011). For EC, they showed that EC effects only emerged if
participants had a valence focus, that is, when they focused their attention on different USs’
valence. When participants focused their attention on other stimulus attributes, no EC effects
emerged. Thus, when there are clearly athletic and clearly non-athletic USs, athleticism is the
distinguishing attribute and people will focus their attention to this attribute. Consequently,
athleticism will be conditioned. This also implies that when a CS co-occurs with a multi-
attribute US, different attributes of the US will be associated with the CS depending on other
USs also present during the conditioning phase. For example, the attribute athletic was
primarily distinguishing Vladimir Klitschko from Obama and Clooney in Experiment 1 and 2;
consequently, a CS paired with Klitschko was associated with athletic. Yet, when Klitschko
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might appear in a conditioning phase with Tyson and Valuev as USs, the attribute
distinguishing him from these two USs is rather educated instead of athletic and,
consequently, a CS paired with Klitschko will be associated with educated (Förderer &
Unkelbach, under review). In sum, this means that USs representing a great number of
attributes can be used to change attribute associations with CSs. However, there are two
parameters that determine which attribute will be conditioned: First, it is the attribute
primarily distinguishing one US from other USs which will be accentuated and, as a
consequence, will be conditioned to the CS. Second, priming USs attributes prior to
conditioning accentuates these attributes and determines which attributes will be conditioned.
5.3 The NEC Process
Several studies showed that NEC, that is, changing attribute associations beyond
valence is possible. That is, through repeated co-occurrence of a neutral stimulus with a
stimulus associated with an attribute (i.e., NEC procedure) this attribute is associated with the
neutral stimulus (i.e., NEC effect). Yet, no certain conclusion can be made about the
underlying NEC process; that is, whether automatic or propositional processes cause NEC
effects. However, there are some hints leading to preliminary assumptions. I will discuss
findings of NEC effects with regard to EC process approaches as I assume that similar
processes underlie EC and NEC phenomena. First, results showed that all kinds of stimuli can
be used as CSs and USs; no content or feature similarity is necessary for NEC effects to occur
(e.g., Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011a, under review; Kim et al., 1996; Exp 7/8 in Meersmans et
al., 2005). Moreover, a yet unpublished study (Exp. 1 in Förderer & Unkelbach, in
preparation-a) explicitly explored if category fit of CSs and USs is necessary for NEC which
would be postulated by the conceptual categorization account (Davey, 1994; Field & Davey,
1999). Results showed that the attribute healthy was associated with human and cereal bar
CSs using both human and food USs associated with being either healthy or unhealthy. That
is, category fit and stimuli similarity was not necessary. However, I assume that it is critical
for NEC that the attribute can plausibly be associated with the CS. A prior study by Todrank,
Byrnes, Wrzesniewski, and Rozin, (1995) conditioning valence to human picture CSs with
odor USs showed that EC effects only emerged when odors were plausibly human (e.g., smell
of soap or sweat). When odors were used which could not plausibly be associated with
humans (e.g., benzyl acetate), no EC effects emerged. Thus, I assume that all kinds of
attributes can be conditioned to completely unspecific stimuli like non-words or shapes;
however, when CSs are humans or foods, for example, attributes need to fit the CS category.
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Thus, it was plausible to associate a cereal bar CS with “healthy” and NEC effects emerged,
but I would assume no NEC effect when a cereal bar CS co-occurs with a steel bar US to
condition “metallic”. This assumption is in line with assumptions of the implicit
misattribution account (Jones et al., 2009) which for EC assumes that it must be plausible that
the CS could be the source of the activated valence. For NEC this would mean that it must be
plausible that the CS could be associated with the attribute. This assumption is also in line
with a propositional account and the assumption of truth evaluation; only if the proposition
(“this cereal bar is healthy”) is plausible and is evaluated as true, NEC effects will emerge.
Second and also relating to the conceptual categorization account (Davey, 1994; Field
& Davey, 1999), Experiment 2 and 3 of our study conditioning the attribute healthy (Förderer
& Unkelbach, in preparation-a) analyzed whether CS-US co-occurrence is necessary for NEC
to occur. Or whether attributes associated with a US category will be associated with the CS
when CS and US have shared features but do not co-occur. Therefore in Experiment 2, we
paired baby CSs with healthy/unhealthy food USs and presented unpaired stimuli which were
pictures of either men or women in between (Exp. 3 used male/female USs and unpaired
healthy/unhealthy food stimuli). Both Experiments showed that baby CSs were associated
with the attributes of the paired USs, but not with the attribute of the unpaired filler stimuli
(e.g., baby CS occurring in contiguity with healthy cereal bar US was associated with being
healthy, but not with being a girl when unpaired stimuli were female faces). That is,
independent of CS-US category fit, US attributes will only be associated with CSs if there is
CS-US contiguity. Thus, a first assumption is that a conceptual categorization (Davey, 1994;
Davey & Field, 1999) as well as a holistic account (Martin and Levey, 1978, 1994) can be
ruled out as the underlying NEC process as both assume feature similarity as a prerequisite for
(N)EC. Instead, it is mere contiguity of stimuli which is necessary for changing attribute
associations.
Third, nearly all results indicate that people immediately inferred the attribute in
question from simple US pictures. Studies of Kim and colleagues (1996), Meersmans and
colleagues (2005), and Förderer and Unkelbach (2011a; under review, Exp. 1/2) showed
conditioning of attributes without accentuating attributes prior to conditioning. Whether this
inference is based on automatic or propositional processes cannot be said. I can only assume
that noticing a specific attribute is more complex and needs more cognitive resources and
controlled processing than noticing mere valence (cf., Olson et al., 2009). Consequently, I
would assume a non-automatic process involved indicating a propositional process involved
in causing NEC effects (cf., De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2009). However, further
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research is needed paralleling the approach within EC research; that is, studying the influence
of the three distinguishing parameters between automatic and non-automatic processes. Thus,
further research should check whether NEC effects will be reduced by limited cognitive
resources, what influence different processing goals have, and whether awareness of CS-US
contiguity is necessary. The study of Meersmans and colleagues (2005, Exp. 6-8) already
showed that NEC effects only emerged when participants were aware of CS-US contiguity,
and also our study (Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011a) provides evidence for NEC only when
participants were contiguity aware. However, considering Hütter and colleagues’ (in press)
findings and their critique on the used awareness measures, the question about awareness for
NEC effects needs to be reconsidered. Additionally similar to EC, it could be attention as a
third factor influencing NEC effects and awareness. A first step would be to replicate prior
NEC findings and using a process dissociation approach like Hütter and colleagues did.
Further, methods used by Field and Moore (2005) to disentangle attention and awareness
influences could be integrated. Further research should also study which influence relational
qualifier (i.e., words specifying CS-US relations) have and whether these can moderate NEC
effects like they moderate EC effects leading to either standard or reversed effects. So far,
comparing Experiment 1 and 2 of our study (Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011a) showed that
standard NEC effects (i.e., CS paired with athletic US is rated athletic) were not qualified by
providing a relation qualifier (is friends with). That is, NEC effects were not stronger when
the positive CS-US relation was emphasized by providing additional information indicating a
positive CS-US relation. Further research should implement qualifier creating negative CS-
US relations (e.g., CS is enemy of US) and see whether NEC effects will be reversed (i.e., CS
paired with athletic US is rated less athletic). Comparable to EC, reversed NEC effects could
only be caused by a propositional reasoning process.
Finally based on our NEC study using multi-attribute USs (Exp. 3, Förderer &
Unkelbach, under review), I assume that it is a focus on attributes distinguishing between USs
that determines which attributes will be conditioned. It seems as if for USs representing a
great number of attributes, the attributes that primarily distinguish this US from other USs
will be accentuated and consequently associated with the paired CS. Thus, I assume that
processing goals, in this case focusing on distinguishing attributes, influence NEC effects.
Based on Experiment 3 of the same study, we also know that priming specific attributes prior
conditioning can influence which attributes will be conditioned. The procedure used to prime
celebrity attributes closely resembled procedures used in research on spontaneous trait
inferences (STI). STI research shows that based on pictures and behavioral descriptions of
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others, people infer traits and ascribe them to the described other. In our study, celebrity
pictures were shown together with information about the celebrity, and participants had to
infer the respective attribute (cf., Crawford, Skowronski, Stiff, & Leonards, 2008; see also
chapter 5.4). As we know from STI research, trait inference is influenced by effortful mental
processes (e.g., Carlston & Skowronski, 2005). Thus, these cognitive processes might have
been active during priming celebrity attributes and led to associating celebrities with these
attributes. Due to conditioning, these primed attributes were associated with neutral logos co-
occurring with the celebrities. Thus, it seems that some effortful cognitive processes were
involved in producing the observed NEC effects. So far, the influence of a propositional
process seems very likely, but if it turns out that awareness of CS-US contiguity is not always
necessary, an automatic process might also be at work. And similar to EC, it might be
possible that multiple processes, respectively at least an automatic and a propositional process
cause NEC effects. Thus, it remains to further research to analyze process variables and
moderating factors of NEC and come to a conclusion about the NEC process.
5.4 Distinguishing NEC from Spontaneous Trait Inference/Transference
So far, I assumed that the observed NEC effects resulted out of simple conditioning
procedures; that is, the repeated pairing of stimuli. However, when observing the effects one
might be reminded of effects caused by spontaneous trait inferences (STI; Winter & Uleman,
1984; Uleman, 1987) or spontaneous trait transference (STT; Skowronski, Carlston, Mae, &
Crawford, 1998). STI and STT research is part of impression formation research (Asch, 1946)
and is concerned with trait inference based on information about behavior of a person. Like
Asch (1946, p. 258) said: “We look at a person and immediately a certain impression of his
character forms itself in us. A glance, a few spoken words are sufficient to tell us a story
about a highly complex matter.” Thus, when people receive the information “Bart kicked a
puppy” they spontaneously infer that Bart is cruel (i.e., STI). Moreover, when a third person
tells that “Bart kicked a puppy” people not only infer that Bart is cruel, but also associate the
trait “cruel” with the third person/the communicator (i.e., STT; see Carlston & Skowronski,
2005). And going even further, Brown and Bassili (2002) showed that STT also occurred for
bystanders and inanimate objects which were consequently associated with the implied trait.
Thus, on an effect level NEC and STI/STT are identical; that is, all effects refer to associating
a target/CS with a trait, respectively attribute which consequently influences target/CS
assessment.
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On a procedural level NEC, STI, and STT also seem similar. NEC procedures comprise
the repeated co-occurrence of a neutral stimulus (CS) with a stimulus representing a specific
attribute (US) (e.g., Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011a). Within STI/STT studies participants
typically see a picture of a person and a sentence describing behavior of an actor which
strongly implies a specific trait. Participants are either told that the person provides a self-
description (STI effects expected), or that the person is a communicator and describes another
person’s behavior (STI effects expected for the actor and STT effects expected for the
communicator) (e.g., Carlston & Skowronski, 2005). One can assume that the person
describing behavior, independent whether he describes his own or someone else’s behavior,
represents a CS within a NEC paradigm. A difference on the procedural level surely lies
within the source of the trait/attribute. Within STI/STT, a trait source is limited to a
description or observation of an actor’s behavior, based on this description/observation a trait
is activated (Skowronski et al., 1998). NEC, however, offers the possibility to use all kinds of
stimuli representing an attribute as no explicit behavior description is necessary. USs can be
pictures of people engaging in activities (like the athletes and non-athletes in Förderer &
Unkelbach, 2011a) which still might be comparable to the behavior descriptions used in
STI/STT studies. But USs can also be celebrities commonly associated with an attribute
(Förderer & Unkelbach, under review), foods associated with being either healthy or
unhealthy (Förderer & Unkelbach, in preparation-a), racing cars associated with being fast
(Kim et al., 1996), and also words naming attributes (like black and white in Galli & Gorn,
2011). Moreover, the NEC phenomenon is not limited to traits implied by behavior but also
more generic attributes like gender represented by male or female USs can be transferred
(Meersmans et al., 2005). Consequently, I assume that on a procedural level STI/STT are
special cases of NEC using behavior descriptions as USs to activate and transfer traits to
actors/communicators (CSs).
On a process level, however, disentangling NEC, STI, and STT is difficult. There exists
general agreement that different processes cause STI and STT effects: Whereas STI is
assumed to be based on an elaborated attributional process, a mere associative process
underlies STT (Carlston & Skowronski, 2005; Crawford, Skowronski, Stiff, & Scherer,
2007). The attributional process of STI involves deeper processing and more elaborated
mental activities, which involve attributional knowledge and rules (Carlston & Skowronski,
2005, p. 1). As a consequence people infer traits form the behavior description during
encoding, attribute it to the actor, and store this knowledge in episodic memory (Uleman,
1987) in the form of indicative associative links, indicating that one construct is a property of
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the other (Carlston & Skowronski, 2005). Despite the inclusion of elaborated mental
activities, the process works rather automatic: According to Uleman, people only need to be
aware of the presentation of target person and behavioral description, but not of stimulus
effects, inference processes, and consequences. And they also do not need any intention to
infer traits from described or observed behavior; that is, trait inferences are made
spontaneously. These assumptions are quite well in line with a propositional EC account; and
findings which led to the assumption of an elaborated attributional process underlying STI are
comparable to findings within EC: For example, cognitive load caused by distractor tasks had
a negative influence on STI and minimized the effect to the size of STT effects (Carlston &
Skowronski, 2005); processing goals demanding for processing the behavior information in
another way than inferring traits also minimizes and could even completely eliminate STI
(Uleman, 1987; Carlston & Skowronski, 2005; Crawford et al., 2007). STT instead is caused
by an automatic association process which is part of a three-step process (Skowronski et al.,
1998): (1) During behavior presentation the respective trait is activated; (2) the activated trait
is associated with the communicator; (3) and when an impression of the communicator is
formed the prior associated trait is automatically activated and influences impression
formation. That is, this STT process account does not consider that the trait was actively
inferred from a description of someone else. This association process is rather shallow and
causes unspecified mental links, respectively associative links between communicator
representation and trait, which result out of mere co-occurrence of the activated constructs.
Thus, an important difference to STI is that within STT no trait judgment is made while
processing the behavior information; the communicator is only associated with the trait. This
does not inevitably imply that the communicator holds this trait. The associated trait will be
considered as one of probably more information when an impression is formed afterwards
(Carlston & Skowronski, 2005). The assumption that STT is caused by a different process
than STI is based on the fact that under standard conditions STI effects were always larger
than STT effects, which indicates deeper processing and stronger trait associations for STI. It
is further based on the fact that moderators have different influences on STI and STT effects.
In contrast to STI, STT is not influenced by limited cognitive resources or processing goals
(Carlston & Skowronski, 2005; Crawford et al., 2007). STT is extremely robust and even
remained stable when participants, for example, were told that communicator pictures and
behavioral descriptions were randomly assigned to each other (Skowronski et al., 1998).
Thus, the assumption of an automatic association process underlying STT and the reported
findings, resemble assumptions and findings within EC proposing an automatic process. STT
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effects only diminished when participants had to recall whether the behavioral information
they received concerned the communicator or a different actor before they completed
dependent measures (forced recall condition in Carlston & Skowronski, 2005). Two other
studies further showed that STT effects can also be eliminated by showing an actor picture in
addition to the communicator picture and behavioral description (Crawford, Skowronski, &
Stiff, 2007; Crawford, et al., 2008). Thus, the forced recall and the additional actor picture
might have helped participants in the STT condition to correctly identify that the information
provided in fact described another person, thus, eliminating STT effects. They might have
enforced more elaborated processing of the description which helped recognizing that the
description provides information about the actor’s traits but not about the communicator’s
traits (see Crawford et al., 2008).
Concerning NEC, there is not much knowledge about the processes underlying it by
now. I can only assume that NEC processes are comparable to the processes causing EC
effects (cf., chapter 5.3). Thus on a process level, I can draw no final conclusion on the
relationship between NEC, STI, and STT until further research analyzed NEC process
variables; I can only make two different assumptions: One would be, if it turns out that NEC
effects are caused by an automatic process it would resemble the association process
underlying STT. That is, due to CS-US co-occurrence the respective attribute is associated
with the CS and consequently influences CS attribute assessment. Then (comparable to the
similarity on the procedural level) STT would constitute a special form of NEC only
occurring when behavioral information is provided in contiguity with a target. In this case,
STI would not be a special case of NEC as it is based on elaborated mental activities, that is,
on a non-automatic attributional process. Alternatively, if it turns out that NEC effects are
caused by propositional processes, this cognitive reasoning process would closely resemble
the attributional process involved in STI. Consequently (comparable to the similarity on the
procedural level), STI could be assumed to be a special case of NEC, which in this case is
limited to person perception and impression formation. Based on the findings that STT is not
impaired by limited resources or processing goals, it is not immediately possible to assume
that STT effects are caused by a propositional NEC process. Propositional reasoning is
influenced by limited resources, processing goals, and awareness (see chapter 3.2). Stating
that STT is a special case of NEC caused by propositional reasoning would only be possible if
we further assume that traits are more easily activated by behavior descriptions (used in STT
paradigms) than by US pictures (often used in NEC paradigms). Behavioral descriptions
might provide trait information more easily as people are used to infer traits from behavior
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(cf., Heider, 1977, p. 46f). However, it might not be immediately clear what should be
inferred from celebrity pictures for example. Consequently, less cognitive resources would be
needed to infer traits from behavioral information than from pictures and a propositional NEC
process might still cause STT under cognitive load. Finally, if it turns out that NEC effects are
caused through automatic and propositional processes, like I assumed it for EC effects (cf.,
multiple-process account in chapter 4.3), both STI and STT phenomena can be seen as special
cases of the NEC phenomenon. That is, STI effects and STT effects would resemble special
NEC effects which are limited to trait inference of human stimuli, and caused by a
propositional (STI effects) or an automatic process (STT effects).
However, I have to admit that until further research will provide information about the
NEC process, I cannot draw any final conclusion on the difference of NEC on the one hand,
and STI and STT on the other on a process level. I can only say that no matter which process
causes NEC effects, NEC is surely a more general and more parsimonious phenomenon than
STI and STT. STI and STT are both limited to inferences drawn from behavioral observations
or descriptions. NEC, however, occurs with diverse stimuli through mere spatial and temporal
contiguity of neutral stimuli and stimuli representing attributes. Thus, NEC is a conceptual
generalization of STI/STT referring to changing attribute associations through conditioning
procedures.
5.5 NEC in the Context of Brand Image Formation
Brand image is defined as a “set of associations linked to the brand that consumers hold
in memory” (Keller, 1993, p. 2). According to Keller, brand associations stem from
consumers’ direct experiences with products or brands, information communicated about
brands, and inferred associations. Associations might be inferred from other entities like
users, company employees, or especially celebrities endorsing a brand (Aaker, 1997). In his
model of meaning transfer, McCracken (1989) postulates that celebrity attributes are
transferred to a brand when the celebrity endorses that brand and thereby create the brand’s
image. Thus, according to McCracken, it is not only celebrities’ credibility or attractiveness
contributing to the acceptability of information provided within ads; but rather, attributes
associated with the endorsing celebrities transfer directly to brands. However, McCracken
only describes the phenomenon, but does not provide any empirical evidence or any
psychological process underlying the meaning transfer. I will argue that the meaning transfer
from celebrity to brand is an instance of NEC.
43
To my knowledge, only Batra and Homer (2004) experimentally examined the
postulated meaning transfer from celebrities to endorsed brand (McCracken, 1989). They
showed that celebrity endorsers reinforced consumers’ brand image believes (here: fun and
sophistication); however, this reinforcement was only successful within a social consumption
context. That is, the brand was only thought to be more fun/sophisticated after endorsement
when participants thought the brand’s product will be consumed in public, but not when
participants thought it will be consumed in private. Thus, only when there was a high social
visibility brand image believes mattered and celebrity endorsement had some effects.
Although, their study provided first evidence for McCracken’s model, there are two issues:
First, the study did not examine initial brand image formation; in fact, known brands with an
already existing brand image were used. Thus, the two celebrities associated with the image
believes of the target brands simply accentuated those brand image believes. There is no
evidence that further, new attributes were transferred from celebrity to brand. It remains an
open question how brands initially acquire associations constituting the brand image. Second,
conclusions are based on rather sparse effects which were not found consistently for all
celebrities, products, and attributes used in the experiments. Batra and Homer, thus, provided
empirical evidence rather for meaning accentuation then for initial meaning transfer; and they
made no assumption about underlying psychological processes.
Based on the findings of our two studies on NEC (Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011a, under
review), I assume that meaning transfer due to celebrity endorsement postulated by
McCracken (1989) is an instance of NEC. That is, through repeated co-occurrence of neutral
brand (CS) and celebrity (US) representing an attribute the attribute is associated with the
brand (NEC effect); consequently the attribute becomes part of the brand’s image. Thus, mere
spatial and temporal contiguity of brand and celebrity is sufficient to form brand images; this
makes NEC procedures more parsimonious than actual celebrity endorsement, as no active
engagement or product usage by the celebrity is necessary.
Our studies have theoretical as well as practical implications: On the theoretical side,
NEC provides us with information about the psychological process underlying the postulated
meaning transfer from an entity representing attributes to a neutral brand or product. Thus, the
more we know about processes involved in NEC and boundary conditions, the more precise
we can predict which requirements need to be met for successful celebrity endorsement and
thus for brand image formation. Based on Experiment 3 of our study pairing logo CSs with
celebrity USs (Förderer & Unkelbach, under review), we know that priming moderates NEC
effects: By priming celebrity attributes prior to conditioning also less salient attributes will be
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associated with brands. This leads to a first practical implication for using NEC procedures in
advertisement: Marketers can make use of less accessible celebrity attributes and make them
prominent by providing participants with respective information about the celebrity or
providing a respective ad context priming the attribute in question. However, they have to
keep in mind that well-known dominant attributes will also be conditioned.
Using celebrity endorsers carries the risk of conditioning of negative attributes, as well.
Some of the most famous celebrities and athletes appear in the news with negative publicity.
Charlie Sheen, for example, is not only associated with humorous anymore, but also with
being drug addicted, immoral, and criminal after being repeatedly caught with drugs and
prostitutes. Or Tiger Woods earlier associated with handsome, successful, and athletic is now
also associated with unfaithful after betraying his wife repeatedly. Marketers must be aware
of the risk that these negative attributes might also be associated with their brand when they
are dominant and readily accessible, or when they become prominent through negative
publicity. And even more crucial, even when brand and celebrity are not shown together
anymore, negative information about the celebrity might influence the brand associations (see
US-revaluation effects in Sweldens, Van Osselaer, & Janiszewski, 2010). To prevent such
negative effects, Sweldens and colleagues recommended using more than one celebrity
endorsing the brand based on their findings that CSs paired with multiple USs are less prone
to US-revaluation effects. Thereby, marketers would further accentuate the intended attribute
and minimize the risk that negative associations with a single celebrity might be associated
with the endorsed brand.
Although I feel certain to assume that changing attribute associations with brands using
entities associated with specific attributes relies on simple NEC procedures, a limitation of
our studies (Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011a, under review) is surely that the results are based
on lab experiments using a computer program. The program repeatedly paired logo CSs with
celebrity USs on a grey computer screen; the procedures are far from resembling a natural
advertising context. Thus, it remains to further research to operationalize NEC procedures in a
fashion which resemble natural ads more closely (e.g., operationalization used by Batra &
Homer, 2004). Using more realistic advertisement contexts in future studies might also shed
light on the role awareness and attention play for NEC effects. Questions we will try to
answer in future studies (Förderer & Unkelbach, in preparation-b) will be: In an internet-
context, will NEC effects occur when brand-celebrity pairings are only shown on a banner on
the top of a screen, while participants have to engage in a task referring to the page content?
Have participants to be aware of brand-celebrity pairings? Moreover, will NEC effects created
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in that way influence behaviour when participants know they were influenced by the ad, and
know the brand attribute was originally associated with the co-occurring entity (i.e., when
they are aware of CS-US contiguity)? Further, it would be interesting to see whether
conditioned brand image has an influence on brand choice moderated through self-image
congruity (cf. Sirgy, Johar, Samli, & Claiborne, 1991). That is, will brands whose conditioned
image is congruent with the consumers self image be liked more and consequently bought
more often? Respectively will consumers who experience high self-image congruity pay
higher prices?
In addition to the artificial setting, our study using celebrity USs (Förderer &
Unkelbach, under review) only used neutral logos as CSs which were associated with no prior
attributes. Research analysing the effect of NEC procedures using celebrity endorsers, or
other entities representing specific attributes on known brands with an already existing brand
image is still pending. Yet, based on findings within the EC paradigm using not-neutral CSs
showing less strong conditioning effects (see Hofmann et al., 2010), I assume that NEC
effects for known brands would be less strong.
Finally, according to the match-up hypothesis (Kahle & Homer, 1985), it is important
for successful celebrity endorsement that the celebrity’s image matches the endorsed
product’s image, and therefore seems to hold relevant information about the brand or product.
When the idea of the match-up hypothesis first came up, this match was limited to
attractiveness; thus, using an attractive celebrity endorser would only be successful for
attractiveness-related products, like cosmetics. Over the years, the concept has become
broader and a match could be based on nearly all relevant attributes (e.g. athletes endorsing
running shoes). Thus, research has shown that when there is a match between the celebrity
endorser’s image and the product category/image purchase intentions were higher (Batra &
Homer, 2004; Lee & Thorson, 2008), celebrities’ attractiveness and credibility had a greater
influence on product evaluation (Kim & Na, 2007), celebrities’ expertise influenced brand
attitudes (Till & Busier, 2000), and believability of the spokesperson was higher and product
attitude was more favourable (Kamins & Gupta, 1994). Our study (Förderer & Unkelbach,
under review) conditioned new logos with no prior image believes which needed to be
matched by the celebrity. Thus, effects for all celebrity USs were equally strong. However, I
assume that when NEC procedures are used to form an image of a real brand a match-up
between celebrity and product category becomes important. Within NEC, it is not only the
celebrity’s credibility and attractiveness which should have a more positive effect on brand
evaluation or purchase intentions, but rather the celebrity attributes itself should be associated
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with the brand. Thus, it is particularly important that celebrity’s attributes seem to contain
relevant information about the brand/product, which is only the case when the celebrity
matches the product category. This argument is similar to the plausibility argument in chapter
5.3. For NEC effects in general, I assumed that it must be plausible to associate the CS with
the attribute which should be conditioned. For NEC effects using celebrity USs and
brand/product CSs, I assume that it must be plausible that the celebrities hold relevant
information about the brand/product. Consequently, further research should check for the
influence of match-up between celebrity’s image and product image when using NEC
procedures to condition attributes to brands.
6. Final Discussion
Within the last decades a large amount of research focused on studying the acquisition
of preferences through EC. EC turned out to be a stable and parsimonious phenomenon which
causes valence changes in initially neutral stimuli due to mere spatial and temporal contiguity
with other liked or disliked stimuli. One of the central questions within EC research was, and
still is, which mental process underlies this form of associative learning and causes EC
effects. Furthermore, preferences are not limited to “positive” and “negative”, but are
complex and based on diverse attributes associated with the attitude object. Thus, another
question is whether this kind of learning based on stimuli contiguity is limited to changing
valence or whether other more specific attribute associations can be changed as well.
Moreover, if changing attribute associations is possible, will it subordinate to the same
processes as EC does? Thus in the current work, I strived to come to a conclusion about the
processes involved in EC and provided evidence for the conditioning of attributes beyond
valence.
6.1 Conclusions on EC
In the beginning, the debate concentrated on differentiating EC from PC, and whether
EC is a special form of PC or an independent instance of associative learning. After more and
more studies implied that EC is definitely a unique form of associative learning, the
discussion went on and different groups of researchers came up with five theoretical process
accounts for EC and provided a great number of results supporting one account or the other.
In the current work, I gave a short overview on EC process accounts, and based on their
assumptions and predictions allocated them to either an automatic or a propositional process.
Further, I provided empirical support for moderated EC effects caused by relational qualifier
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linking CSs and USs (Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011b). Depending on the qualifier (loves or
loathes) standard or reversed EC effects emerged. This finding replicated findings of Fiedler
and Unkelbach (2011) and moreover, showed that reversed EC effects emerged even when
participants did not engage in active encoding procedures but passively received information
about CS-US relations. Following, I discussed why these findings can only be explained by a
propositional reasoning process, and why automatic process accounts or Balance Theory
(Heider, 1946) provide no alternative explanations. Although reversed EC effects can only be
caused by a propositional reasoning process, this allows for no final conclusion on the EC
process in general. As I have discussed, there might be learning settings where automatic
processes can cause EC effects, too. For example, Hütter and colleagues’ (in press) study
provided evidence that EC effects did indeed emerge when participants were not aware of CS-
US contiguity. Thus, like some researches considered already (e.g., Lovibond & Shanks,
2002; De Houwer et al., 2005; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), I assume a multiple-
process account in that EC effects could be caused through automatic and propositional
processes. Whether one or the other process runs, or probably both at a time, depends on
context factors like available cognitive resources, attention to CS-US contiguity, and salient
relational information. Yet, further research is needed to analyze context factors and to be
able to make conclusive predictions under which circumstances which process works.
Especially interesting is the delineation of the role that contiguity awareness and attention
play (cf., Field & Moore, 2005), and what role awareness of relational information plays. So
far, I can only assume that relational information needs to be prominent to moderate EC
effects (see Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011b). Further studies should experimentally manipulate
awareness of relational information, respectively attention which is allocated to this
information. Only this empirical test would allow for a conclusion on the necessity of salient
relational information.
6.2 Conclusions on NEC
An essential part of the current work was to show that other attributes than mere valence
will be associated with stimuli through simple conditioning procedures, thus, providing an
incidence of associative learning. Two studies showed that attributes can be conditioned to
neutral stimuli after repeated co-occurrence with stimuli representing these attributes (NEC
procedure). Consequently, the initially neutral stimuli are associated with the respective
attribute, which is what I called the NEC effect. The studies showed that this phenomenon of a
change in associated attributes is not limited to human stimuli, but is a general learning
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phenomenon applicable to all kinds of stimuli. We found NEC effects for athletic human USs
paired with human CSs, but also when CSs were non-words, shapes, or logos (Förderer &
Unkelbach, 2011a). NEC effects also emerged when logo CSs co-occurred with celebrity USs
representing multiple attributes (Förderer & Unkelbach, under review). Most intriguing about
the second reported NEC study is that it showed that different attributes can be conditioned
within one session and people, even after a short conditioning phase of less than five minutes,
made precise attribute ratings conforming to NEC effects. Participants immediately
recognized the attribute in question from a US picture and only this attribute was associated
with the CS afterwards. Moreover, by priming a specific US attribute before conditioning, we
could control which attribute was conditioned in the end. This feature had important practical
implications for the use of NEC procedures to form brand images within advertisements.
Hence, it is certain that changing attribute associations beyond and independent of
valence is possible, and that it is a widely applicable robust phenomenon. As has been
discussed, NEC is also more than mere STI or STT, as it does not require behavioral
information or direct trait descriptions. Rather, NEC occurs with all kinds of USs somehow
associated with an attribute. Thus, NEC is a more general and parsimonious phenomenon, a
conceptual generalization of trait inference and transfer beyond mere human stimuli. As has
been discussed, no conclusion can be drawn on the NEC process. The goal of the current
study was to provide first empirical evidence for conditioning of attributes beyond valence
which was successfully reached. Future research should now focus on processes involved in
causing NEC effects. Similar to EC process research, factors showing great promise for the
analysis of the NEC process surely are manipulation of cognitive resources, processing goals,
attention, and awareness. This would shed light on the involvement of automatic and
propositional NEC processes.
A further question is whether CSs representations are mentally linked to the attribute
representation, or whether CSs representations are mentally linked to USs representations in
human mind. Depending on these links, for example, changes of US attribute associations will
have different effects on CSs. Like it was done for EC, further research should deal with this
issue by implementing US-revaluation settings. If it turns out that US-revaluation, in this case
a change of attributes associated with the US, leads to a change of attributes associated with
the CS this implies a direct link between CS and US representations. If US-revaluation has no
influence on CS associations this implies that only the initial attributes associated with the US
are linked to the CS representation. If I assume that deeper elaboration and more effortful
cognitive processes are needed to recognize specific attributes beyond mere valence and thus,
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further assume that rather propositional than automatic processes are involved in NEC, I
would assume a direct link of the CS to the attribute (instead of a link to the US
representation). Similar to the processes involved in STI, deeper elaboration would lead to
storing a specified CS-attribute link in episodic memory. US-revaluation, hence, should have
no influence on attributes associated with the CS. Yet as this is simply an assumption, there
might be instances where, due to automatic processes, CS-US representations are linked in
memory. Consequently, US-revaluation should have an influence.
6.3 General Conclusion
The current work elaborated on EC and NEC as phenomena describing preference
learning. After empirical evidence has been provided, and theoretical and practical
implications have been discussed, I conclude that EC as well as NEC are general associative
learning phenomena: Through spatial and temporal contiguity of neutral stimuli and stimuli
associated with valence or a specific attribute, the valence/attribute is associated with the
neutral stimuli, that is, (N)EC effects emerge. Considering all findings of EC and NEC
effects, I assume that automatic as well as propositional processes cause (N)EC effects. For
the future it will be interesting to detect whether and how these conditioned preferences
influence behavior.
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Abstract
Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to valence changes of initially neutral stimuli (CSs)
through repeated pairings with positive or negative stimuli (USs). The current study is about
the moderating role of qualifiers that specify the CS-US relation during these pairings. We
show successful EC with pictures of men (CSs) and of liked/disliked animals or landscapes
(USs). More importantly, the same pairings resulted in standard and reversed EC effects
depending on semantic qualifier of the CS-US relation. CSs loving positive (negative) USs
became more positive (negative), while CSs loathing positive (negative) USs became more
negative (positive). These data favor a propositional EC account (De Houwer, 2009) over a
purely associative account, as they show that it is not only relevant that CS and US are
related, but how they are related.
.
Key words: evaluative conditioning, associative learning, propositional reasoning, attitude
acquisition
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Hating the cute kitten or loving the aggressive pit-bull:
EC effects depend on CS-US relations
Evaluative conditioning (EC) is the phenomenon that initially neutral stimuli change
their valence through repeated pairings with positive or negative stimuli (Levey & Martin,
1975). For example, people like initially neutral persons (CSs) who appeared together with
cute kittens (US+) more than neutral persons who appeared together with aggressive pit-bulls
(US-). In many conceptualizations of EC, this change in liking is supposedly due to the
automatic formation of an association between CS and US representations (see Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2006). Here, we investigate the possibility that changes in liking are not
mediated by the formation of associations, but by the formation of propositions, as suggested
in propositional learning accounts (De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond,
2009; Shanks, 2010). We do this by testing whether the effect of CS-US pairings on liking is
moderated by semantic qualifiers that provide information about the nature of the CS-US
relation. In other words, does it matter whether the neutral person loves or loathes the kitten
(or the pit-bull)?
Procedurally, EC is based on the co-occurrence of two or more objects in the
environment. As said, the underlying process was traditionally assumed to be associative,
stimulus-driven, and largely independent from intentions, consciousness, or cognitive
resources (e.g., Olson & Fazio, 2001; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Similar to animal
learning studies, such associative approaches assume that pairing CS and US forms a link
between the representations of the stimuli, and activation of the CS representation co-
activates the US representation and the respective evaluative response. With this assumption,
EC elegantly explains many psychological phenomena, from persuasion to attitude
acquisition and ingroup favoritism (see Walther, Nagengast, & Trasselli, 2005, for an
overview).
However, the assumption that human learning is a purely associative process has been
challenged on theoretical as well as on empirical grounds (Mitchell, De Houwer, &
Lovibond, 2009; Shanks, 2010). In particular, Mitchell and colleagues presented a
propositional account of human learning. The main difference between an associative and a
propositional approach is the way knowledge is represented in memory. While associations
imply a simple link between stimuli, propositions allow specifying the way in which stimuli
are related (Mitchell et al., 2009, p. 184). As propositions have an internal semantic structure
the same way language does (Shanks, 2007, p. 294), they can include semantic qualifiers that
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specify how stimuli are related. Such relational qualifiers can be for example, “predicts”
“prevents”, “loves”, or “loathes”. Thereby, propositions composed of two stimuli linked by a
relational qualifier provide more information than a mere association does.
For EC, this propositional approach implies that changes in valence should be
moderated by semantic qualifiers specifying the CS-US relation. For example, if a qualifier
establishes a positive CS-US relation (e.g., CS likes US), standard EC effects would occur. If
a qualifier establishes a negative CS-US relation (e.g., CS dislikes US), reversed EC effects
would be expected. For example, if people learn that a target person (CS) loathes a kitten they
like (US+), they should dislike the target person. Such a moderating effect of relational
qualifiers would be incompatible with an associative approach as CS and US representations
are assumed to be merely linked and no information about how they are linked is stored in
memory. Thus, activation of the CS always co-activates the US and its evaluative
connotation; the possibility of a reversed evaluative response does not fit well with an
associative approach to learning. A propositional approach, on the other hand, can explain
such moderating effects, because the proposition contains the information about how CS and
US are related. If this relation is “prevents” instead of “predicts”, or “dislikes” instead of
“likes”, reversed evaluative responses should emerge.
Above that, we subscribe to a propositional approach for two further reasons. First,
functional necessity: As noted by De Houwer (2009), in the multitude of possible
associations in the world, it is unclear when and which associations are learned. Without the
interplay of top-down and bottom-up processes, any organism relying on the pure bottom-up
automatic association of co-occurring stimuli in the environment is surely lost. Second,
empirical evidence: A propositional account is better able to incorporate the influence of
awareness (Stahl, Unkelbach, & Corneille, 2009; Wardle, Mitchell, & Lovibond, 2007),
processing goals (Corneille, Yzerbyt, Pleyers, & Mussweiler, 2009), and cognitive resources
(Pleyers, Corneille, Yzerbyt & Luminet, 2009). While there are notable demonstrations of
learning and evaluative learning without awareness (Ruys & Stapel, 2009), goals, and
resources, there is a growing literature testifying the importance of higher cognitive functions
in conditioning.
There is already one study related to the question of whether relational qualifiers
moderate EC effects, namely the study of Fiedler and Unkelbach (2010). In four experiments
they found standard and reversed EC effects depending on the encoding of the CS-US
relation. When CSs were perceived as friends with USs+ or USs-, standard effects emerged
(i.e., liked and disliked CSs, respectively); however, when CSs were enemies of USs+ or
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USs-, reversed effects emerged (i.e., disliked and liked CSs, respectively). Yet, these effects
only emerged when participants actively construed this relation by rating the CS-US
relationship as highly likely (Exp. 1 and 2), or when they had to generate reasons why CS and
US are friends or enemies (Exp. 3). When participants passively observed CS-US
relationships, only standard EC effects emerged (Exp. 4). The authors concluded that EC
effects depend on the interplay of bottom-up (US valence) and top-down processes (active
relation construal and encoding schemes).
In the current study, we extend the research of Fiedler and Unkelbach (2010) and
examine whether the moderating effect of relational qualifiers also occurs when CS-US
relations are passively observed. We believe their failure to find reversals without active
encoding processes is a design problem. They manipulated their qualifiers (i.e., is friend vs.
enemy of) as a between-participants factor: As the qualifier was constant across all trials, it is
of low salience and not particularly informative for a given trial. Thus, the qualifier might not
have entered the proposition when participants passively observed the CS-US pairings. In
addition, the conclusion that active encoding is necessary was based on a null effect (i.e.,
non-significant reversal in Experiment 4). And finally, all their experiments used human CSs
and USs, raising the question whether their encoding scheme effect (i.e., friend vs. enemy) is
specific to learning about humans.
Accordingly, the present experiment uses a standard EC procedure (e.g., Walther,
2002), but with relational qualifiers for the CS-US pairings varying within-participants. This
should make the qualifiers more salient, leading to differential CS-US propositions and
thereby moderated EC effects, even when they are only passively observed. We predict that
the relational qualifier “loves” results in standard EC effects (e.g., CSs loving US+ are more
positive than CSs loving US-), whereas the qualifier “loathes” results in reversed EC effects
(e.g., CSs loathing US+ are more negative than CSs loathing US-). In addition, we use
animals and landscapes as USs; if these stimuli lead to equally strong moderated EC effects
as involving only human CSs, it would testify the generality of the effect beyond human CS-
US pairings.
Method
Participants, design, and materials. Sixty-six University of Mannheim students (40
women, 26 men) participated for 5€ payment and a chocolate bar. They were randomly
assigned to one of the US type conditions (animals vs. landscapes). The relational qualifier
(“loves” vs. “loathes”) and US valence (positive vs. neutral vs. negative) varied orthogonally
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within-participants. Twelve black-and-white portraits of neutral men served as CSs; colored
pictures of 60 animals (e.g., cat, dog, snake), and 60 landscapes (e.g., forest, mountains,
desert) served as USs. A Visual Basic program controlled instructions, stimulus presentation,
and recorded the dependent variables.
Procedure. The experiment took place in a laboratory at the University of Mannheim.
Participants were recruited from a student cafeteria at the university grounds. Participants
first saw all 60 pictures of animals or landscapes to ensure an overview of the pictures’
evaluative tone and range before the ratings (see De Houwer, Baeyens, Vansteenwegen, &
Eelen, 2000). The program randomized the presentation anew for each participant. After the
first presentation, the program presented the pictures again and participants rated them on a
scale from -100 “triggers very negative feelings” to +100 “triggers very positive feelings”.
Based on the individual ratings the computer program selected the four most positive (US+),
the four most negative (US-), and four neutral pictures (US0
,
most closely to zero) for each
participant.
For the conditioning phase, the program randomly assigned the selected USs to the
twelve CSs. Two positive, two neutral, and two negative USs were randomly selected to be
shown with the relational qualifier “loves”; the remaining six USs would be shown with the
qualifier “loathes”. Instructions told participants that the experiment investigates how people
react to different pictures. Therefore, they would see a series of picture pairings, each
consisting of a picture of a man and of an animal (or a landscape, depending on experimental
condition). Their first task would be to watch this presentation. When they clicked a button,
the presentation started. CSs were presented 1s alone, then the qualifier “loves”/”loathes”
appeared for another 0.5s, and then the respective US appeared for another 2.5s with the CS
and the qualifier still on the screen. CSs were presented in the upper half of the screen and
USs in the lower half. After a pause of 1.5s the next pairing was shown. The program
presented each pair six times at random, resulting in 72 trials. After the conditioning phase,
participants were instructed to rated the CSs’ likeability on an 8-point scale, with higher
values indicating higher likeability. The program presented the CSs in a random order in the
middle of the screen with the rating scale below; by clicking a button participants could
confirm their rating and continue with the next CS rating. Upon completing the ratings, the
experimenter paid, thanked, and debriefed participants.
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Results
Across both US types, animals and landscapes, participants’ pretest ratings of US+,
US0, and US- showed the expected linear decrease in liking from US+ (M = 90.01, SD =
16.44) to US0 (M = 1.18, SD = 5.25) to US- (M = -88.22, SD = 16.77).
To investigate the predicted EC effects, we calculated participants mean likeability
ratings for each two CSs paired with positive, neutral and negative USs, separately for those
presented with the relational qualifiers “loves” and “loathes”. Figure 1 presents these means
by US valence, US type (animal vs. landscape), and relational qualifier. As the Figure clearly
shows, for both animal and landscape USs, we found a standard EC effect for “loves”, which
is completely reversed for the “loathes” condition.
Figure 1. Mean likeability ratings of CSs paired with US+, US0, and US- separated by
US type (animal vs. landscape) and relational qualifier (loves vs. loathes). Higher
values indicate higher likeability and error bars represent standard errors of the means.
We analyzed these means using a 2 (US type: animals vs. landscape) x 2 (relational
qualifier: loves vs. loathes) x 3 (US valence: positive vs. neutral vs. negative) ANOVA with
repeated-measures on the last two factors. This analysis showed the expected significant
interaction between relational qualifier and US valence, F(2, 63) = 48.53, p < .001. To clarify
this interaction we calculated two further ANOVAs; one considering only CSs loving USs
and one considering only CSs loathing USs. For CSs loving USs, CSs paired with USs+ were
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liked most (M = 5.92, SD = 1.39), CSs paired with USs0 were mildly positive (M = 5.10, SD
= 1.13), and CSs paired with USs- were disliked (M = 3.33, SD = 1.66), resulting in a
significant linear contrast, F(1, 64) = 77.81, p < .001, d = 2.17. When CSs loathed USs, the
effect was completely reversed: CSs paired with USs+ were disliked (M = 3.51, SD = 1.50),
CSs paired with USs0 were neutral (M = 4.39, SD = 1.15), and CSs paired with USs- were
liked most (M = 5.34, SD = 1.29), also resulting in a significant linear contrast, F(1, 64) =
58.44, p < .001, d = 1.88
1
. Obviously, the interaction of these two linear contrasts was also
highly significant, F(1, 64) = 93.41, p < .001, d = 2.38.
Additionally, the overall ANOVA showed a main effect for qualifier valence: CSs
loving USs were liked more (M = 4.78, SD = 1.77) than CSs loathing USs (M = 4.41, SD =
1.52), F(1, 64) = 8.28, p = .005, d = 0.67. This effect is most visible for CSs paired with USs0
in Figure 1: CSs loving something neutral were liked more (M = 5.10, SD = 1.13) than CSs
loathing something neutral (M = 4.39, SD = 1.15), F(1, 64) = 14.84, p < .001, d = 0.92. There
was no main or interaction effect for US type (animal vs. landscape), all Fs < 1, ns.
Discussion
Our experiment showed likeability changes of initially neutral men (CSs) through
repeated pairing with liked or disliked animals or landscapes (USs). More importantly,
semantic relational qualifiers moderated changes in CS’ likeability: A qualifier stating a
positive relation between CS and US (CS loves US) led to standard EC effects; a qualifier
stating a negative relation (CS loathes US) led to reversed EC effects. Thus, CSs loving
positive USs were liked more than CSs loving neutral or negative USs, and CSs loathing
positive USs were liked less than CSs loathing neutral or negative USs. As expected, US type
(animal vs. landscape) did not matter, testifying the generality of the effect.
These data contradict associative EC accounts, because the moderating relational
information is not included in the assumed CS-US link. Rather, the data support a
propositional account. The propositional account assumes that EC is mediated by the
formation of propositions (De Houwer, 2009). Propositions have an internal semantic
structure (Shanks, 2007) and can therefore include semantic qualifiers of the CS-US relation,
that is, information about how CS and US are related. These semantic qualifiers clearly
moderated the EC effects in the present experiment.
1
All single comparisons between CS+ and CS0 and between CS0 and CS-were also significant, compared
within loved and loathed USs.
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A possible explanation for the current results in terms of associative processes is that
the qualifier “loves” led to an excitatory associative link between CS and US representations,
while the qualifier “loathes” led to an inhibitory link. As we have an almost perfectly
symmetrical data pattern for the “loves” and “loathes” conditions, this explanation must
assume that a link inhibiting associations with positive information in memory leads to
negative evaluative responses and inhibiting associations with negative information leads to
positive evaluative responses. This assumption leads to new and interesting predictions for
further research. However, given the huge literature on valence asymmetries (e.g.,
Unkelbach, Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmüller, & Danner, 2008), it seems unlikely that an inhibiting
link to negative information should lead to the same evaluative response as an excitatory link
to positive information (and vice versa, see Figure 1). Thus, the moderating effect of the
relational qualifiers does indeed not fit well with an associative approach to learning.
A non-predicted but interesting finding was that the relational qualifiers themselves
served as valence sources: CSs loving USs were liked more than CSs loathing USs. This
effect, however, was particularly due to the pairing involving neutral stimuli. If we repeat the
reported analysis without the neutral CSs, the main effect of relational qualifiers completely
vanishes. A very similar effect was observed by Fiedler and Unkelbach (2010); it seems
when no other valence source is available, the valence of the relational qualifier determines
the change in CS valence. However, given clear US valence, this influence all but vanishes,
and the nature of the CS-US relation determines the change in CS valence.
The present results go beyond research by Fiedler and Unkelbach (2010) in showing
that reversed EC effects can be found when perceivers only passively observe CS-US
relations. Fiedler and Unkelbach only found these effects when participants actively engaged
in encoding the provided information about CS-US relations. This discrepancy can be
explained procedurally: Fiedler and Unkelbach varied relational qualifiers as a between
factor; this renders the qualifier much less informative, salient, and powerful. In contrast, we
varied the relational qualifier within participants. And while these authors argued for top-
down encoding schemes, we show that relational qualifiers can directly moderate EC effects.
One might argue that by introducing loves/loathes as relational qualifiers the current
experiment does not represent an instance of EC anymore. Yet, procedurally the experiment
follows the definition of EC by De Houwer (2007; also Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini,
Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). The change in CS valence is an EC effect because it can be
attributed to CS-US pairings. However, this effect was moderated by semantic qualifiers
specifying the CS-US relationship, leading to standard or reversed EC effects.
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Furthermore, one might consider Heider’s Balance Theory (1946) as an alternative
explanation for the moderated EC effects. According to Balance Theory, a triad (here:
participant, CS, and US) is balanced if all three relations are positive, or if two are negative
and one is positive. The theory states that people generally strive for balanced triads. For
example, if participants loathe a US which is also loathed by a neutral CS, they generally like
the CS, thereby creating a balanced triad (i.e., two negative relations and one positive). Thus,
we have to acknowledge that Balance Theory explains standard and our reversed EC effects.
Yet, Balance Theory can be seen as a particular type of propositional learning model: It
assumes that changes in stimulus liking are mediated by qualifiers that specify the nature of
the relation between stimuli in a triad. In particular, Balance Theory predicts how different
propositions (e.g., participant likes US+ and CS likes US+) lead to new propositions about
the likeability of the CS. Thus, it is not a competing model, but rather a special case of
propositional learning with specific predictions.
However, there is one general caveat. The present experiment only used direct CS
ratings to measure EC effects. Thus, we cannot exclude demand effects. It is possible that
participants guessed the experiment’s intentions and rated CSs according to their memory
about a CS being paired with a specific US and a specific relational qualifier, even though CS
valence did not change for them at all. Although direct CS ratings are a well-established and
widely used measure for EC effects, further research is necessary showing these effects with
indirect measures (e.g., affective priming) as a safeguard against demand effects during
measurement.
If we accept this limitation, the present data show that semantic qualifiers specifying
the CS-US relation moderate CS likeability changes due to CS-US pairings. This supports a
propositional EC account, because in contrast to associative accounts, it allows to learn not
only that CS and US are related, but how they are related.
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Abstract
Evaluative conditioning is the valence transfer from positive/negative stimuli to initially
neutral stimuli through repeated co-occurrences of those stimuli. Theoretically, it should also
be possible to condition non-evaluative attributes. Three experiments show the transfer of a
non-evaluative attribute: By repeatedly presenting neutral people with athletic or non-athletic
people, initially neutral people became more athletic while valence was controlled for
statistically and experimentally. A fourth experiment generalizes the effect to shapes and
non-words as neutral stimuli. Athleticism transfer was found on direct ratings and indirect
measures (a modified Affect Misattribution Procedure and a categorical priming task). These
data broaden the applicability of conditioning as a procedure for trait acquisition with
important practical implications for advertising and brand image formation.
Keywords: evaluative conditioning, associative transfer, non-evaluative attribute, affective
misattribution procedure, categorical priming
Non-Evaluative Conditioning
3
Beyond evaluative conditioning! Evidence for transfer of non-evaluative
attributes
The question how people acquire preferences, their likes and dislikes, is central in
social psychology. Evaluative conditioning (EC) provides an elegant and parsimonious
answer: People learn to like or dislike initially neutral stimuli through mere spatial and
temporal proximity to other positive or negative stimuli (Levey & Martin, 1975). In a typical
EC procedure neutral stimuli (CSs) repeatedly co-occur with positive or negative stimuli
(USs); for example, a neutral person is repeatedly presented with a liked or disliked person.
The CS acquires the US’ valence and the initially neutral person is liked or disliked
afterwards.
The EC phenomenon is robust and has been demonstrated across many areas and
paradigms (De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001). In a recent review, Hofmann, De
Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, and Crombez (2010) discuss five theoretical EC accounts.
Interestingly, none of these accounts explicitly restricts EC to valence only. As social
evaluations are hardly confined to simple likes and dislikes, it is an intriguing question
whether this learning mechanism is limited to a basic like–dislike dimension or whether
conditioning of other, non-evaluative attributes and traits is also possible. While it makes
intuitively sense that valence has a central and special role, the theoretical accounts allow
learning of non-evaluative attributes through repeated co-occurrence of two stimuli.
Following this idea, we will show the transfer of the attribute athletic using an EC procedure.
One might argue that using the term “non-evaluative” conditioning is then a misnomer
when we refer to EC procedures and theories. We use this term in the sense that we want to
condition specific evaluative responses towards stimuli, for example “athletic”, that are not
driven by evaluative responses of liking and disliking. As almost all attributes and traits have
some positive or negative connotation, we will show conditioning of such attributes beyond
valence by controlling for valence experimentally and statistically; the resulting effect is what
we will call non-evaluative conditioning.
Existing evidence for non-evaluative conditioning
Empirical evidence for non-evaluative conditioning is mixed; Kim, Allen, and Kardes
(1996) showed transfer of “speed” and “softness” to a pizza delivery brand and a facial tissue
brand. The pizza delivery was thought to deliver faster when repeatedly paired with racing
cars and the facial tissue seemed to be softer after pairing it with kittens. Yet, Olson,
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Kendrick, and Fazio (2009) failed to condition the attributes “size” or “speed” to Pokémons
(Exp. 1). Only when “size” was primed before conditioning (Exp. 2) an effect was found.
They argued that non-evaluative attributes are not as attention-evoking as evaluative
information and hence needed to be highlighted artificially to be conditioned. However, they
used a great amount of distraction stimuli within a dual task situation. This might have
reduced cognitive resources and awareness for pairings, and consequently reduced
conditioning especially for the less salient non-evaluative attributes (compare Pleyers,
Corneille, Yzerbyt, and Luminet, 2009).
So far, only one set of experiments showed non-evaluative transfers involving human
CSs: Meersmans, De Houwer, Baeyens, Randell, and Eelen (2005) conditioned gender to
babies. After repeatedly pairing pictures of gender-ambiguous babies (CSs) with female/male
faces (USs), participants rated the babies to be girls or boys depending on the respective US-
gender. However, this effect was only found in 2 out of 6 experiments (Exp. 2, 6) on direct
rating scales and in Experiment 6 only for CS of which pairings participants were
contingency-aware of. Similarly, when Kanji served as CSs (Exp. 7, 8), conditioning effects
were only found for “aware” stimuli and only in Experiment 7 an EC effect was found on an
associative priming measure. Besides the inconsistent data pattern, the observed effects could
be due to simple valence transfers, as female faces are generally perceived more positive than
male faces, by men and women alike (e.g., Rhodes, 2006). Hence, it is possible that pairings
with female/male USs conditioned positive/negative valence to the CSs. When participants
were asked to assess gender, they might have inferred their gender rating from the positive or
negative feeling they had about those babies.
Thus, although transfer of non-evaluative attributes through EC procedures seems
possible theoretically, unequivocal empirical evidence is lacking so far (see above). Using the
attribute athleticism, the present study aims to show that people (CSs) can acquire attributes
via EC procedures even when valence is excluded as an alternative explanation; this will be
shown on direct and indirect dependent measures.
Preview of the Experiments
Experiment 1 will show that conditioning of athleticism is possible beyond simple
valence transfer. To ensure that CSs indeed acquire the attribute (i.e., neither task demand
characteristics nor explicit memory during measurement cause the effect) we will show
conditioning effects in an indirect measure, a semantic version of the Affect Misattribution
Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). While Experiment 1 includes
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the relational qualifier “is friend with” to connect the two stimuli during the conditioning
phase, which is based on De Houwer’s (2009) propositional EC account, Experiment 2 and 3
replicate the athleticism transfer without this qualifier. Experiment 3 uses a categorical
priming measure, replicating the effect on latencies instead of response proportions (i.e., the
AMP effect). Experiment 4 uses shapes and non-words as CSs, to show that the effect for
human CSs is a special case of a more general conditioning effect.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 used a standard EC procedure (e.g., Walther, 2002) to transfer the
attribute athletic with one deviation: Following De Houwer’s (2009) propositional account
(see also Fiedler & Unkelbach, 2011), we provided the relational qualifier “is friend with”,
linking CSs with USs. As athleticism is most likely a positive concept, we controlled for
valence experimentally by selecting USs rated equal in valence, and statistically by collecting
ratings of CSs’ athleticism as well as likeability.
To ensure that conditioning effects are not due to deliberate inferences or memory
effects during measurement, we included a modified version of the AMP (Payne et al., 2005).
Originally, the AMP assesses peoples’ affective reactions: Participants see an affective
picture flashed immediately followed by a Chinese character (Kanji). They are asked to
decide if the Kanji gives a pleasant or unpleasant impression. The idea is that participants
misattribute their affective reaction caused by the affective picture (prime) to the Kanji
(target). Following the approach of Imhoff, Schmidt, Bernhardt, Dierksmeier, and Banse
(2010), we established a Semantic Misattribution Procedure (SMP): Instead of affective
pictures, CS pictures were used and the critical question for participants was if Kanji
represent words with an athletic or non-athletic meaning. We expected that people
misattribute the athleticism from athletic CSs to the Kanji following these CSs. The
procedural details (see below) of this method make strategic inferences or explicit memory
effects during measurement unlikely.
Method
Participants, design, and materials. Forty-nine Universität Heidelberg psychology
students (33 women, 16 men) participated either for 3€ payment or course credit. We
manipulated within-participants whether initially neutral persons (CSs) were paired with
athletic or non-athletic persons (USs). Eight portrait photographs of men served as CSs. For
each participant, four CSs were randomly assigned to be paired with athletic USs; the
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remaining four were paired with non-athletic USs. USs were selected based on pretest data
ensuring athletic and non-athletic USs only differed in athleticism and not in likeability
ratings
1
. To check for measurement order effects, we counterbalanced direct athleticism and
likeability ratings and the SMP trials. A Visual Basic program controlled instructions,
stimulus presentation, and recorded the dependent variables.
Procedure. Experimental sessions included up to six participants. Participants were
seated in front of a PC and told they would see a series of pictures they should evaluate
afterwards. In the conditioning phase, CS-US pairs were presented; they were assigned
randomly anew for each participant. Each of the eight pairs was presented eight times,
resulting in 64 pairings. CSs were visible for 1s alone, then the label “is friend with” was
added for another 0.5s and the respective US appeared for another 2.5s. CSs were presented
in the upper half of the screen and USs in the lower half. After a pause of 1.5s the next
pairing was presented. For the dependent measures, half of the participants completed the
SMP first and then rated each CS on athleticism and likeability on 8-point scales, with higher
values indicating higher rated athleticism and likeability; the other half completed the ratings
first, and afterwards the SMP.
For the SMP, participants were instructed they would see two pictures in rapid
succession, the first being a familiar picture and the second being a Kanji. They were told that
the first picture served as an orientation stimulus and they should decide whether a Kanji
represents a word with an athletic or non-athletic meaning as fast as possible. They should
only react to the Kanji and not to the preceding picture. Each trial consisted of a CS being
visible for 75ms, followed by a blank screen for 125ms, and a Kanji for 100ms
2
. A black-
and-white noise picture immediately replaced the Kanji until participants made their decision
by pressing one of two marked keys on the keyboard. After finishing the dependent measures,
they were thanked, paid, and debriefed.
Results
Measurement order had no effects in all analyses, all Fs < 1, ns; therefore, we omit
this factor from the analysis report.
1
Athletic US pictures: beach volleyball player, cycler, cross country runner, short track runner. Non-athletic
USs: a man in front of a PC, one recording sounds, and two playing with different game consoles. USs strongly
differed in athleticism ratings (athletic USs:M = 7.16, SD = 0.22; non-athletic USs: M = 3.82, SD = 0.41; on a
scale from 1 to 8), but did not differ in likeability ratings (athletic US:M = 4.70, SD = 0.49; non-athletic US:M
= 5.36, SD = 0.50).
2
Presentation times were used according to Experiment 1 of Payne and colleagues (2005).
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Direct ratings. We calculated participants’ mean athleticism ratings for the four
athletic CSs and the four non-athletic CSs and compared them in a repeated-measures
ANOVA. As predicted, CSs repeatedly paired with athletic USs were rated more athletic (M
= 5.33, SD = 1.30) than CSs paired with non-athletic USs (M = 4.10, SD = 0.93), F(1, 48) =
25.07, p < .001, d = 1.40. Likeability ratings for athletic (M = 4.12, SD = 1.15) and non-
athletic CSs (M = 3.95, SD = 1.01) did not differ significantly, F(1, 48) = 0.99, ns. Figure 1’s
first part presents the full pattern.
Figure 1. Mean athleticism and likeability ratings of athletic and non-athletic CS in
Experiments 1 to 4. Error bars represent standard errors of the means.
Although likeability ratings were not affected, to control for valence, we predicted the
athleticism ratings from the likeability ratings in a regression analysis; the residuals from this
regression are therefore adjusted for likeability. We then repeated the analysis based on these
likeability-adjusted residuals, which are now centered around zero. Still, CSs paired with
athletic USs were rated more athletic (M = 0.58, SD = 0.90) than CSs paired with non-athletic
USs (M = -0.58, SD = 1.14), F(1, 48) = 22.52, p < .001, d = 1.36.
SMP. Overall, participants responded fast to the Kanji (M = 870ms, SD = 340ms). We
computed the probability to judge Kanji as having athletic meaning when they appeared after
athletic compared to non-athletic CSs. Figure 2’s left part presents these probabilities; we
analyzed them with the same ANOVA as the direct ratings (Lunney, 1970): Kanji following
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athletic CSs were more likely judged as athletic than Kanji following non-athletic CSs, F(1,
48) = 14.04, p < .001, d = 1.03.
3
Figure 2. Mean probabilities of "athletic" responses to Kanji
following athletic and non-athletic CSs in the SMP in Experiment
1, 2 and 4. Error bars represent standard errors of the means.
Discussion
Experiment 1 showed higher athleticism ratings for initially neutral persons when they
were repeatedly paired with athletic USs compared to non-athletic USs. This effect remained
stable even when we statistically controlled for valence influences. Yet, can we call this
effect non-evaluative conditioning? Did the CSs indeed acquire the attribute athleticism?
Participants might have simply remembered the pairings and made their judgments based on
simple inferences from their observations: If they remember a CS was paired with an athletic
US, they could infer that the CS must be athletic as well. Similarly, participants might have
guessed the experiment’s purpose and responded in line with the situational demands.
3
Direct ratings of athleticism and SMP-effects were correlated significantly in this and the following
experiments (Exp. 1 r = .43, p = .002; Exp. 2 r = .51, p < .000; Exp. 4 r = .58, p < .000). Direct ratings of
athleticism and congruency effect in the priming task were not correlated (Exp. 3 r = -.04, ns), which is most
likely due to the lesser reliability of the priming measure.
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To exclude such deliberate inferences, demand or memory effects, the SMP was
included. As predicted, Kanji shown after athletic CSs were judged athletic significantly
more often than Kanji shown after non-athletic CSs. Based on the CSs’ short presentation
times and the task’s instructions, we are confident that CSs indeed acquired the attribute
athleticism.
However, based on De Houwer’s (2009) propositional EC account, we included the
link “is friend with” in the conditioning procedure. To test whether the effect depended on
this relational qualifier, we omitted this link in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 without the qualifier “is friend with” linking
neutral CSs and athletic/non-athletic USs in the conditioning phase. If successful
conditioning of athleticism depends on this qualifier, the non-evaluative conditioning effects
should be smaller or eliminated completely.
Method
Participants. Thirty-nine visitors (26 women, 13 men) of a Heidelberg student
cafeteria were recruited and paid 5€ for their participation.
Procedure. The experiment took place at the cafeteria where participants were
recruited from. In an adjacent room, participants were seated in front of laptops. During the
conditioning phase, “is friend with” was omitted - everything else was identical to
Experiment 1.
Results
Measurement order had again no influence, all Fs < 1, ns, and is therefore omitted
from all following analyses.
Direct ratings. As predicted, CSs paired with athletic USs were rated more athletic (M
= 5.72, SD = 1.07) than CSs paired with non-athletic USs (M = 3.94, SD = 1.17), F(1, 38) =
32.65, p < .001, d = 1.83. Likeability ratings did not differ (athletic CSs:M = 3.96, SD =
1.12; non-athletic CSs:M = 4.13, SD = 1.00), F(1, 38) = 0.59, ns. Figure 1’s second part
shows the full pattern of the means.
When we controlled for likeability statistically using regression analysis, the
difference between athletic (M = 0.91, SD = 1.10) and non-athletic CSs (M = -0.91, SD =
1.03) was even more pronounced, F(1, 38) = 35.94, p < .001, d = 1.92.
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SMP. Participants mean response latency was again fast (M = 1096ms, SD = 448ms).
As in Experiment 1, Kanji following athletic CSs were more likely judged to have athletic
meaning than Kanji following non-athletic CSs, F(1, 38) = 18.19, p < .001, d = 1.33. Figure
2’s middle part displays the respective probabilities.
Discussion
Even without the relational qualifier linking CSs and USs, Experiment 2 showed
highly significant athleticism effects beyond valence. As in Experiment 1, we found clear
SMP effects, supporting actual non-evaluative conditioning, independent form explicit
memory or strategic inferences. However, one might question the SMP as indirect measure.
Experiment 3 will therefore use a categorical priming task to indirectly measure conditioning
of athleticism. While the SMP uses on response proportions, the priming task uses
participants’ categorization latencies.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 2 using a categorical priming task instead of the
SMP. If CSs acquire the attribute athleticism, they should facilitate the categorical
classification of targets as athletic and hinder the classification of targets as non-athletic (see
McNamara, 2005).
Method
Participants, design, and materials. Forty-nine University Heidelberg psychology
students (39 women, 10 men) participated either for 3€ payment or course credit. The basic
design was identical to Experiment 2. For the categorical priming task, CSs served as primes
and 16 athletic and 16 non-athletic objects from 8 categories served as targets. Athletic
categories were balls, sport shoes, bikes, and rackets with four target stimuli per category.
Non-athletic categories were computers, microphones/earphones, game pads, and guitars;
with four target stimuli per category. Measurement order, categorical priming followed by
direct ratings, was fixed.
Procedure. Experimental sessions took again place in the laboratory and conditioning
procedures were identical to Experiment 2. After conditioning, participants completed the
categorical priming. They were instructed that they would see two pictures in rapid
succession but should only react to the second picture. Their task was to decide as fast as
possible whether a target picture showed an athletic or non-athletic object. Each trail
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consisted of a fixation cross (visible for 700ms), followed by a CS (visible for 150ms),
followed by a blank screen for 50ms (SOA = 200ms), and the target. The target was visible
until participants pressed one of two marked keys on the keyboard; key assignment (athletic
vs. non-athletic) was counterbalanced. The intertrial-interval was 750ms. For each
participant, CS-target pairings were randomized: each athletic and non-athletic CS was paired
with one athletic and non-athletic target out of each target-category; the same applied to non-
athletic CSs, resulting in 64 trials. After the priming measure, participants directly rated CS
athleticism and likeability on 8-point scales. Then they were thanked, paid, and debriefed.
Results
Direct ratings. Again, CSs paired with athletic USs were rated more athletic (M =
5.76, SD = 1.47) than CSs paired with non-athletic USs (M = 3.45, SD = 1.05), F(1, 48) =
72.97, p < .001, d = 2.42. Likeability ratings did not differ (athletic CSs:M = 3.94, SD =
1.42; non-athletic CSs:M = 3.63, SD = 1.12), F(1, 48) = 0.14, ns. Figure 1’s third part shows
the full pattern of the means.
When we controlled for likeability statistically as above, athletic CSs (M = 1.07, SD =
1.37) were still rated more athletic than non-athletic CSs (M = -1.07, SD = 0.92), F(1, 48) =
73.87, p < .001, d = 2.44.
Categorical priming. For each participant trials which were categorized incorrectly
were deleted (6% total); latencies longer than 1000ms were trimmed to 1000ms, and 5 trials
with latencies faster than 250ms were deleted. Based on these data, we calculated participants
mean latencies for athletic and non-athletic objects, separately for athletic and non-athletic
CSs, and compared them in a repeated-measures ANOVA. Figure 3 present the full pattern of
means, showing the interaction: Decisions in congruent trials (athletic CS – athletic target;
non-athletic CS – non-athletic target) were significantly faster (M = 616ms, SD = 85ms) than
in incongruent trials (athletic CS – non-athletic target; non-athletic CS – athletic target;M =
628ms, SD = 91ms), F(1,47) = 4.37, p < .042, d = 0.53. Besides the important interaction,
there was a main effect for target category: decisions on athletic targets are significantly
faster (M = 598ms, SD = 84ms) than on non-athletic targets (M = 645ms, SD = 100ms),
F(1,47) = 51.22, p < .001, d = 2.04.
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Figure 3. Mean latencies for athletic and non-athletic
targets following athletic and non-athletic CSs. Error
bars represent standard errors of the means.
Discussion
Experiment 3 replicates Experiment 1 and 2; moreover, conditioning effects were also
found in a categorical priming task. When athletic targets were preceded by athletic CSs,
participants categorized targets faster than when preceded by non-athletic CS; and vice versa
for non-athletic targets. Using this well-established indirect measure, we are confident that
the CSs indeed acquired the attribute “athletic”. The faster responses for the “athletic”
category are easily explained with the idea of “markedness” (Clark & Clark, 1977): The
athletic category is marked in comparison to the non-athletic category, which leads to overall
faster classification responses (see also Unkelbach, Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmüller, & Danner,
2008, for the processing of marked and unmarked categories).
Finally, to show that the phenomenon is indeed conditioning applied to social
cognition and not only a very special case of social perception, Experiment 4 broadens the
scope by using shapes and non-words as CSs.
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Experiment 4
Experiment 4 replicated Experiment 2 with shapes and non-words as CSs instead of
humans, thereby showing that non-evaluative conditioning is a general phenomenon.
Method
Materials.We created eight mono-colored shapes which were clearly distinguishable,
but no standard shapes (e.g., circles or rectangles). Non-words were selected from internet
name-generators and pre-rated: Five raters consensually agreed that the shapes ware neutral
with respect to athleticism and valence. Eleven students pre-rated 25 non-words on 7-point-
scales. We selected 8 non-words for which athleticism (M = 3.64, SD = 0.29) and valence
ratings (M = 3.93, SD = 0.47) did not differ.
Participants and design. Forty-three Universität Heidelberg psychology students (35
women, 8 men) participated either for 3€ payment or course credit. They were randomly
assigned to one of the two CS-type conditions (“shape” vs. “non-words”). US athleticism
(athletic vs. non-athletic) was again varied within participants.
Procedure. Procedures were similar identical to Experiment 2, except for the
materials: Depending on condition, mono-colored shapes and non-words served as CSs.
Further, as participants needed to be able to process the non-words in the SMP, we extended
the prime presentation times in the SMP from 75ms to 150ms and therefore reduced the blank
screen from 125ms to 50ms. According to Payne et al. (2005), longer prime presentations do
not create a problem for the interpretation of AMP results.
Results.
CS-Type and measurement order had no effects in the analyses, all Fs < 1, ns, and are
therefore omitted from the following presentation.
Direct ratings. Shapes and non-words as CSs paired with athletic USs were rated
more athletic (M = 5.99, SD = 1.02) than CSs paired with non-athletic USs (M = 3.47, SD =
1.21), F(1, 43) = 75.69, p < .001, d = 2.60. CSs ratings did also differ in likeability (athletic
CSs: M = 5.56, SD = 1.13; non-athletic CSs:M = 4.52, SD = 1.52), F(1, 43) = 19.39, p <
.001, d = 1.29. Figure 1’s rightmost part displays the full pattern.
When we computed the means from the residuals of predicting athleticism from
likeability, athletic CSs were still rated more athletic (M = 0.85, SD = 1.09) than non-athletic
CSs (M = -0.85, SD = 1.05), F(1, 43) = 44.89, p < .001, d = 2.07,paralleling the previous
experiments.
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SMP. Participants mean response latency was again fast (M = 862ms, SD = 350ms).
SMP results are given in Figure 2’s rightmost part. Kanji following athletic CSs were more
likely judged to have athletic meanings than Kanji following non-athletic CSs, F(1, 43) =
17.08, p < .001, d = 1.21.
Discussion
Both shapes and non-words acquired the attribute “athletic” over and above valence
through repeated paring with athletic or non-athletic people. This was true for direct ratings
and the SMP. Thus, we believe that the present effects are due to a general conditioning
mechanism by which shapes, non-words, and people can acquire specific attributes through
simple spatial and temporal contiguity to stimuli holding those attributes.
General Discussion
Across all experiments, we found transfer of the attribute athleticism from stimuli
possessing that specific attribute to neutral stimuli by simple repeated pairings: As shown in
Figure 1, across three experiments, neutral people (CSs) paired with athletic people (USs)
were rated more athletic than people (CSs) paired with non-athletic others (USs) and
Experiment 4 shows the same effects for shapes and non-words.
We believe the present experiments are the first clear demonstration of transfer of a
specific attribute through EC procedures independent from and beyond valence. They go
beyond prior work by consistently showing conditioning of athleticism on direct and indirect
measures (in contrast to Meersmans et al., 2005) and without the need of highlighting the
attribute through priming (compare Olson et al., 2009).
Uncontested, the attribute athleticism possesses valence, and this is probably true for
every attribute of interest. However, the athleticism effect persisted even when we
statistically removed the variance in the ratings due to likeability. Further, three out of four
studies did not even show systematic likeability effects for athletic and non-athletic CSs.
Thus, we believe the likeability effect in Experiment 4 was rather due to an inference from
athleticism to likeability, and not the other way round.
Yet, the direct ratings in all four experiments are open to the alternative explanation of
strategic inferences or explicit memory effects during measurement. Having no other
information, participants might simply remember with whom a CS was paired and infer their
athleticism ratings from that. The inclusion of the SMP and the categorical priming task
ameliorate this problem: Participants were clearly instructed to guess the meaning of the
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Kanji and ignore the shortly flashed CS. If CSs did not acquire the attribute, participants
would need to recognize the CS, remember the paired US, and judge the Kanji accordingly.
However, this seems very unlikely in light of participants’ fast responses (see latency data),
and the facilitation effect in the categorical priming task.
Table 1
Percentages of CSs for whom participants were aware or un-
aware for US-athleticism.
Experiment 1 2 3 4
aware 80.10 75.96 81.12 91.57
un-aware 19.90 24.04 18.88 8.43
This feature is important, because memory for the pairings was high in all
experiments: We additionally measured participants’ awareness of CS-US parings with
procedures similar to Stahl, Unkelbach, and Corneille (2009; awareness of the attribute
athletic, not of the US identity), revealing high awareness rates (cf. Table 1); that is, they
could report whether specific CSs were presented with athletic or non-athletic USs.
Moreover, awareness was significantly correlated with direct ratings and SMP results (cf.
Table 2), suggesting that awareness is a central requirement for successful non-evaluative
conditioning, like it is for EC (see Hofmann et al., 2009; Meersmans et al., 2005; Pleyers,
Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 2007). This feature could explain previous failures to show
non-evaluative conditioning (Meersmans et al., 2005) and the necessity of highlighting the
respective attribute (Olson et al., 2009). As argued by Stahl and colleagues (2009), awareness
is a pre-requisite for successful conditioning, leading to the empirical challenge to show
conditioning beyond memory and demand effects. We believe the present experiments met
this challenge using two indirect measures. In addition, based on these finding and the current
line of research (Fiedler & Unkelbach, 2011; Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011), we subscribe to a
propositional account (De Houwer, 2009) which can best integrate our awareness data. Yet,
the present studies aimed at substantiating basic non-evaluative conditioning effects and
further research is needed to delineate which theoretical process is at work.
Non-Evaluative Conditioning
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Table 2
Correlations of direct and indirect dependent variables with awareness for CS-
US athleticism separate for athletic and non-athletic CSs.
athletic CS non-athletic CS
Direct Rating .14* -.29**Experiment 1
SMP .20** -.24**
Direct Rating .17* -.35**Experiment 2
SMP .11 -.27**
Experiment 3 Direct Rating .40** -.25**
Categorical Priming .02
Direct Rating .28** -.11Experiment 4
SMP .01 -.17*
Note. Direct ratings and SMP: For athletic CSs positive correlations show
higher athleticism ratings for higher awareness; for non-athletic CSs negative
correlations show lower athleticism ratings for higher awareness. Categorical
Priming: For athletic and non-athletic CSs positive correlations show higher
priming effects for higher awareness.
*p < .05
**p < .01
Another interesting aspect is that both direct and indirect effects were mainly caused
by athletic CSs. In hindsight, this pattern is to be expected: The attribute athletic is clearly
defined and strongly associated with doing sports. However, non-athletic is less well-defined:
is it being inactive, being lazy, or playing computer games? Thus, it is difficult to capture
non-athleticism in one picture. The neutral people (respectively shapes/non-words) paired
with pictures of people doing sports acquired the attribute athletic; but the neutral people
(shapes/non-words) paired with pictures of people doing something else than sports stayed
neutral.
Beyond the theoretical significance that non-evaluative conditioning is possible, the
data has clear practical implications: Especially Experiment 4, as it used shapes and non-
words, which are part of brand logos, provides an explanation how differentiated brand
Non-Evaluative Conditioning
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images are formed (e.g., Batra & Homer, 2004); for example, when cereal bar brands become
by itself symbols for healthiness and athleticism, due to sportive celebrities endorsing this
brand. Simply the repeated co-occurrence of brand and celebrity might lead to a transfer of
some celebrity attributes to the brand. Future research will test if non-evaluative conditioning
also works with brands as CSs and how specific celebrity attributes as US can be highlighted
to ensure only these desired ones are conditioned (Förderer & Unkelbach, in preparation).
Conclusions
We demonstrated how people, and more generally, any stimulus, can acquire a
specific attribute through simple spatial and temporal co-occurrences with stimuli possessing
this attribute. These demonstrations of non-evaluative conditioning broaden the
understanding of how stimuli acquire attributes through a simple learning mechanism.
Transferring non-evaluative attributes through EC procedures shows how differentiated
preferences and specific stimulus aspects are acquired, providing an elegant and
parsimonious explanation of attribute and trait acquisition.
Non-Evaluative Conditioning
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Non-evaluative conditioning of specific attributes with multi-attribute US
Sabine Förderer & Christian Unkelbach
Universität zu Köln
Non-evaluative conditioning (NEC) refers to changes in attribute associations of
initially neutral stimuli (CSs). Due to mere spatial and temporal contiguity of CSs with
stimuli representing an attribute (USs), CSs are associated with this attribute. Empirical
research showed that changing and creating attribute associations via conditioning is possible;
however, proof for conditioning only specific attributes is pending. In three experiments we
show specific NEC: Using celebrities as USs, Experiment 1 and 2 show conditioning of
specific attributes to logos beyond valence within one conditioning phase; additionally, these
effects persist over time and thereby might influence behavior afterwards. Experiment 3
shows how priming celebrity attributes allows conditioning specific attributes even when
multi-attribute USs are used. These data show that conditioning of specific attribute
associations is controllable and have theoretical as well as practical implications for brand
image formation.
key words: evaluative conditioning, associative learning, priming, brand image, celebrity
endorsement
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Non-evaluative conditioning of specific attributes with multi-attribute US
People and objects are associated with more or less specific attributes. Our friend
Peter might be associated with the attributes smart, strong, and athletic; and a BMW might be
associated with the attributes sporty, luxurious, and high quality. An intriguing question
within social cognition research is how these associations are created and how the association
process can be controlled. Here, we suggest non-evaluative conditioning (NEC
1
) as a
procedure to create and change attribute associations with objects. Similar to evaluative
conditioning (EC), mere spatial and temporal contiguity of a neutral stimulus (CS) with a
stimulus representing an attribute (US) should be sufficient to associate the CS with the
respective attribute. We assume that very specific attribute associations can be conditioned
instead of mere general positive or negative “feelings” about the CS. Moreover, we assume
that when USs represent multiple attributes (i.e., multi-attribute USs), it is still possible to
condition very specific attributes.
The question how stimuli acquire their associated attributes is central for studying
preferences. Although, preferences refer to the liking or disliking of stimuli, they are not
limited to mere positive or negative feelings about a stimulus. They also include specific
attributes associated with a stimulus, like a person who is nice, but also smart and athletic.
Thus, the central aim of the current study was to show how attribute associations as created.
Levey and Martin (1975) suggested EC as a parsimonious phenomenon causing preference
formation in terms of learning likes and dislikes through conditioning procedures. EC
procedures refer to the repeated pairing of neutral stimuli (CSs) with liked or disliked stimuli
(USs); as a result, initially neutral CSs are liked or disliked post-conditioning. This change in
valence is what it known as the EC effect (cf., De Houwer, 2007). Research showed that EC
is a very robust phenomenon applicable to all kinds of stimuli and stimuli modalities (for an
overview, see Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). Yet, EC effects
refer only to changes in valence; they do not imply changes in associated attributes. On the
other hand, EC accounts about possible processes causing EC effects do not limit EC
procedures to causing only changes in valence (Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011a). We assume
that specific attribute associations beyond valence can also be created and changed through
repeated pairing of stimuli (i.e., through EC procedures), which is what we call NEC.
1
Prior research also used terms like associative transfer of non-evaluative stimulus properties (Meersmans et al.,
2005), associative learning of non-evaluative co-variations (Olson, Kendrick, & Fazio 2009), and semantic
conditioning (Galli & Gorn, 2011) to refer to the same phenomenon.
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Moreover, if multi-attribute USs are paired with CSs it can be controlled that only specific
attributes will be conditioned, but not all attributes associated with the USs.
Empirical evidence of conditioning attributes, that is, of NEC is rather scarce: Kim,
Allen, and Kardes (1996) made a pizza delivery brand (CS) seem to deliver faster by
repeatedly pairing it with a racing car (US); and a facial tissue brand (CS) seemed to be softer
after pairing it with kittens (US). Meersmans, De Houwer, Baeyens, Randell, and Eelen
(2005) conditioned gender to either babies or Kanji (CSs) through repeatedly pairing them
with pictures of either male or female persons (USs). Although both studies found changes in
CSs attribute ratings, they suffered from a methodological problem: The experiments did not
control for valence effects per se. It might be possible that simply US valence was
conditioned, which led to the observed effects on the provided rating scales (e.g., fast = good
in the context of pizza delivery; female = good/cute in the context of face perception).
Recently, Förderer and Unkelbach (2011a) provided clear evidence for conditioning of
attributes beyond valence: They conditioned athleticism to neutral men, shapes, and non-
words (CSs) by repeatedly pairing them with athletic or non-athletic men (USs) and
controlled for valence statistically. NEC effects were found on direct athleticism ratings as
well as on indirect measures (in a semantic misattribution procedure and in a semantic
priming procedure).
The term non-evaluative might be a bit misleading as nearly all attributes possess
valence and will result in a positive or negative evaluation of a person or object (e.g., soft
tissue, fast delivery, and athletic men are all positive). By using the term “non-evaluative”
conditioning we refer to creating and changing attribute associations beyond valence changes
(Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011a). Thus, it is not only the athlete’s positive valence which is
associated with the neutral man due to conditioning. Instead, it is indeed the attribute
“athletic” which is associated with the man. Beyond that, it is yet unclear whether attributes
are transferred through NEC procedures implying the CS is athletic, or whether the CS is
merely associated with the attribute athletic which does not mean it is athletic. Förderer and
Unkelbach (2011a) referred to NEC as a phenomenon of transferring attributes; yet, this is
imprecise. First, there is no data showing that attributes were really transferred instead of
merely associated with the CS. Second conditioning cannot make people athletic or make the
pizza delivery faster; the stimuli do not acquire the attribute. Especially for logo or brand CSs
it is difficult to assume that attributes are transferred; that is, that logos/brands become
athletic, sexy, or smart. A smart logo has no meaning outside of marketing contexts; the more
precise assumption is that people and objects are associated with those attributes. Thus, in the
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current study we refer to NEC as a phenomenon referring to creating and changing attribute
associations for CSs.
So far, prior studies conditioned only one attribute in a conditioning phase. USs were
either male or female emphasizing gender as prominent attribute (Meersmans et al., 2005), or
either clearly athletic or non-athletic emphasizing athleticism as prominent attribute (Förderer
& Unkelbach, 2011a). However, no study tried to condition several attributes within one
procedure and never examined NEC effects when multi-attribute USs were used. The refined
questions thus are: Is it possible to condition several attributes within one conditioning phase
where attributes are not further emphasized by clearly opposed USs? Moreover, is it possible
that only specific attributes are conditioned even if USs represent more than one attributes?
And is it possible to control which specific attribute of a multi-attribute US is associated with
a paired CS? Therefore, the first aim of the current study was to condition several specific
attributes and ensure CSs will be associated with only one specific attribute which their paired
US represents. That is, participants should rate CSs high on one specific attributes, but not on
other attributes even if these have the same valence. The second aim was to implement a
procedure to control specific NEC effects and ensure only intended attributes will be
conditioned.
In Experiment 1, we used celebrity USs each associated with one of five attributes and
paired them with neutral logo CSs. After conditioning, CSs should be associated only with the
attribute their paired US represents, but not with other also positive attributes. Thereby, we
aimed to show two things: First, we intended to provide first evidence for conditioning
several attributes within one conditioning phase. The critical question was whether attributes
can be conditioned even if they are not further emphasized by using USs which were clearly
opposed on the attribute in question. Thus, similar to the valence focus that seems necessary
for EC (Gast & Rothermund, 2011), the question was whether attributes were prominent
enough to be recognized by participants and conditioned to CSs. Second, we aimed to show
that not only valence was changed into a positive direction and logos were consequently rated
high on all positive attributes; but that in fact logos were associated with specific attributes
and rated high only on the attribute their paired US represented. Additionally, we
implemented two US-conditions: In one condition, CSs were paired with only one US
representing an attribute; in the other condition, CSs were paired with three USs representing
the same attribute. Some EC studies already showed differences in EC effects between CSs
paired with one or many USs of the same valence (e.g., Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009; Sweldens,
Van Oesslaer, & Janiszewski, 2010). Here, we intended to test whether participants can infer
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the respective attribute from one US or whether several USs are needed to emphasize the
respective attribute; that is, we tested whether NEC effects differ in their strength.
Experiment 2 examined whether NEC effects persist over time. Therefore, we used the
same conditioning procedures as in Experiment 1, but measured NEC effects with a delay of
one day. Providing evidence for persisting NEC effects is very interesting for applying NEC
procedures in real live settings. Only if conditioned preferences last over time they are able to
influence behaviour.
In Experiment 3, we implemented a procedure to accentuate specific US attributes and
thereby control that only specific attributes were associated with CSs. Prior NEC studies used
USs for which one attribute was clearly prominent; however, stimuli and people in particular
are commonly associated with several attributes. Some of these attributes might be positive,
others however might be negative and should not be associated with the CS. Especially when
NEC is systematically used to create associations (e.g., to form brand images), it should be
controllable which attributes will be conditioned. Therefore, we used celebrity USs who
represent more than one attribute (e.g., sexy and familial for Angelina Jolie) and implemented
a priming procedure (cf., Higgins, Rholes, and Jones, 1977) to control NEC effects. For each
celebrity US one of two attributes was primed by providing information emphasizing one
specific attribute prior conditioning. Afterwards, we analysed whether CSs were associated
with only the primed attributes or also with the other not-primed attributes of USs.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 used a NEC procedure to condition the attributes humorous, sexy,
educated, athletic, and soft to neutral logos by repeatedly pairing them with celebrities
representing these attributes. As we assume that NEC procedures can be successfully used to
create brand images (see final discussion), we chose these attributes because they are
important within current advertisement to create specific brand images. The chosen attributes
do not overlap with each other, allowing to test whether specific attributes were associated
with CSs beyond positive valence in general. Ideally, participants should rate logo CSs high
only on the specific attribute of paired celebrity USs, but not on other attributes which were
also positive, thereby, providing evidence for specific attribute conditioning beyond valence.
We implemented two US-conditions to test whether one celebrity US is sufficient to
change attribute associations: Thus, CSs were either paired with one US or with three USs
representing the same attribute. As associations of specific attributes should be changed, these
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attributes should be more prominent when more celebrities, which represent the same
attribute, are paired with one logo, leading to stronger NEC effects.
Pretest
To select appropriate celebrity USs, we conducted a paper-and-pencil pretest. The test
showed 25 pictures of celebrities widely known in Germany (e.g., Vladimir Klitschko,
George Clooney, and Barack Obama). Twenty-nine participants rated all celebrities on the
attributes humorous, sexy, educated, athletic, and soft on 8-point likert-scales ranging from
“absolutely” to “not at all”. In addition, they rated how much they liked each celebrity. Based
on the means and standard deviations for each celebrity, we selected three celebrities for each
of the five attributes, resulting in 15 USs. Therefore, only celebrities were chosen who scored
high on just one attribute (with a minimal SD) but not on the other four and who were neutral
in likeability (representing valence). Chosen celebrities were for example Jim Carrey for
humorous and George Clooney for sexy.
Main Experiment – Method
Participants, design, and materials. Forty-nine Universität Heidelberg psychology
students (38 women, 11 men) participated either for a chocolate bar and 2€ payment or course
credit. Five neutral logos served as CSs; the logos were successfully used in previous research
and consisted of a colorized shape and a non-word (Förderer and Unkelbach, 2011a,
Experiment 4). The celebrity pictures selected in the pretest served as USs. As a within-
participants factor, we manipulated which CS was randomly assigned to be paired with
humorous, sexy, educated, athletic, or soft celebrity USs, constituting the within factor
attribute. Between-participants we manipulated whether CSs were paired with only one US
(US-condition: single-US), which was randomly selected out of the three celebrities per
attribute, or with all three celebrities per attribute (US-condition: multiple-USs). A Visual
Basic program controlled instructions, stimulus presentation, and recorded the dependent
variables.
Procedure. Experimental sessions included up to four participants. The experimenter
seated participants in front of PCs and told them they would see a series of pictures and
should evaluate logos afterwards. In the conditioning phase, the computer program presented
CS-US pairings; these parings were assigned randomly anew for each participant. In the
single-US condition, each of the five CSs was presented nine times with the US representing
the to-be-conditioned attribute; in the multiple-USs condition, each of the five CSs was
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presented three times with each of the three USs, also resulting in nine pairings and 45
pairings overall.
CSs were visible for 1s alone, then the respective US appeared for another 2.5s with
the CS still on the screen. CSs were presented in the upper half of the screen and USs in the
lower half. After a pause of 1.5s the next pairing followed. Afterwards, participants rated each
logo CS on the attributes humorous, sexy, educated, athletic, and soft and on likeability on
11-point scales (ranging from for example 0 = “not sexy” to 10 = “very sexy”). After
finishing their ratings, the experimenter thanked, paid, and debriefed participants.
Results
The between-participants factor US-condition (single-US vs. multiple-USs) had no
main or interaction effects; it is omitted from the following report, all related Fs < 1, ns.
First, we tested whether the five logo CSs differed in their likeability ratings using a
repeated measurement ANOVA: The logos did not differ significantly in valence, F(4, 45) =
0.99, ns; thus, the conditioned attribute had no influence on overall logo-valence
2
.
Next, we compared the specific attribute ratings across CSs: We tested whether
participants rated logos paired with celebrities representing specific attributes higher on that
attribute than other logos paired with celebrities representing other attributes. Therefore, we
built contrasts for each logo: The rating of the attribute the logo was conditioned with was
weighted with +1; the rating of this attribute for the other logos was weighted with -0.25. The
resulting contrast score is positive when the attribute rating of the logo conditioned with this
attribute was higher than the average attribute rating of the other logos. These contrast scores
were tested against zero using t-tests. For all five logos, contrast scores were positive and
significantly differed from zero: humorous logoM = 2.53, SD = 2.82, t(48) = 6.29, p < .001;
sexy M = 1.16, SD = 2.46, t(48) = 3.30, p < .001, educated logo M = 1.63, SD = 2.18, t(48) =
5.25, p < .001; athletic logoM = 1.37, SD = 3.11, t(48) = 3.07, p = .004; and soft logoM =
1.56, SD = 3.49, t(48) = 3.13, p = .003. Accordingly, the overall mean of all contrasts
significantly differed from zero,M = 1.65, SD = 1.89, t(48) = 6.10, p < .001. In sum, these
analyses showed that respective attributes were successfully conditioned to the; that is, each
logo was rated higher on its conditioned attribute than other logos.
2
As we have no control condition, the logos might all have increased in likeability due to celebrity pairings; yet,
the main argument is about the conditioning of specific attributes beyond valence.
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We also compared attribute ratings within CSs
3
: For each CS, we tested whether only
the intended attribute (e.g., humorous for logo paired with humorous celebrities) was
conditioned and rated higher than the other attributes (i.e., sexy, educated, athletic, soft, and
likeability). To control for rating tendencies we z-standardized participants’ ratings for each
attribute (as it might be possible that a participant overall gives higher ratings on humorous
than on sexy independent of the conditioned attribute). Thus, positive values indicate high
ratings of a given attribute relative to the participant’s mean rating of that attribute across
logos. Then, we calculated mean scores of “remains” for each logo based on the z-
standardized attribute- and likeability-scores of this logo except for the score of the attribute
the logo was conditioned with (e.g., for a logo paired with a humorous celebrity, “remains”
equals the mean of z-standardized scores of sexy, educated, athletic, soft, and likeability).
Table 1’s upper half shows the full pattern of results; as this table shows, for all logos the to-
be-conditioned attribute received the highest scores.
Table 1
Z-standardized logo (CSs) ratings on attributes and likeability, and mean of “remains” in Experiment 1
and 2 (standard deviations in parentheses).
humorous sexy educated athletic soft likeability remains
Experiment 1 (n = 49)
humorous CS .72 (.75) -.25 (.82) -.24 (.76) -.10 (.93) -.14 (.83) .07 (.85) -.13 (.47)
sexy CS .00 (.82) .35 (.89) -.10 (.89) .06 (.71) .09 (.82) .11 (.82) .03 (.45)
educated CS -.25 (.85) -.25 (.85) .68 (.78) -.18 (.82) -.31 (.81) -.05 (.86) -.21 (.52)
athletic CS .00 (.87) .05 (.91) -.17 (.86) .36 (.95) -.07 (.91) .10 (.85) -.02 (.52)
soft CS -.47 (.74) .09 (.89) -.16 (.88) -.14 (.92) .42 (.97) -.23 (1.06) -.18 (.51)
Experiment 2 (n = 38)
humorous CS .35 (.99) -.14 (.91) -.31 (.87) -.10 (.96) -.27 (.90) .24 (.87) -.12 (.51)
sexy CS .16 (.72) .24 (.84) .06 (.79) -.09 (.92) .02 (.86) .04 (.80) .04 (.40)
educated CS .04 (.93) -.05 (.85) .20 (.99) -.16 (.84) .03 (.91) -.25 (.96) -.09 (.51)
athletic CS -.29 (.95) -.23 (.91) .04 (.86) .32 (.83) -.12 (.91) -.01 (.88) -.12 (.54)
soft CS -.26 (.74) .18 (.93) .01 (.94) .03 (.89) .34 (.85) -.02 (.94) -.01 (.53)
Note. For each CS conditioned attribute is highlighted bold.
3
We know there is an overlap in variance of the analyses across/within CSs (respectively in Experiment 3, of
mixed models for CSs ratings) as both analyzed partly the same data. Yet, both analyses are highly informative
and emphasize different aspects of the data.
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To test this pattern, we ran separate repeated measures ANOVAs and tested the z-
standardized scores of the conditioned attribute against the “remains”-score. For all attributes,
a logo’s conditioned attribute was rated higher than the remains: The humorous logo was
rated higher on humorous than on remains, F(1, 47) = 35.81, p < .001. The sexy logo was
rated higher on sexy than on remains, F(1, 47) = 7.35, p = .009. The educated logo was rated
higher on educated than on remains, F(1, 47) = 42.40, p < .001. The athletic logo was rated
higher on athletic than on remains, F(1, 47) = 5.75, p = .021. And finally, the soft logo was
rated higher on soft than on remains, F(1, 47) = 16.55, p < .001. In sum, these results showed
that participants rated each logo significantly higher on the intended attribute than on other
attributes; that is, CSs were associated with only one specific attribute.
Discussion
Experiment 1 showed that it is possible to create specific attribute associations of
neutral logo CSs through mere spatial and temporal contiguity with celebrity USs
representing these attributes (i.e., through NEC procedures). Thus, initially neutral logos were
associated with the attributes humorous, sexy, educated, athletic, or soft. Specifically, the data
showed that logos conditioned with a specific attribute were rated higher on that attribute than
other logos conditioned with different attributes (analysis across logo CSs). This equals basic
NEC effects. Moreover, logos were rated higher on the conditioned attribute compared to the
other attributes (analysis within logo CSs). This equals specific NEC effects: CSs were
associated with one specific attribute the paired USs represents, but not with other also
positive attributes. Thus, specific attributes were conditioned with CSs beyond general
positive valence, which otherwise might have influenced all attribute ratings. It seems that
within a short conditioning phase participants inferred attributes of celebrity USs which were
consecutively associated with paired logo CSs. Interestingly, results did not differ between
US-conditions (single-US vs. multiple-USs); participants correctly inferred intended attributes
from one celebrity and it was not necessary to further accentuate attributes by using three
celebrities representing the same attribute.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 intended to show that the NEC effects observed in Experiment 1 persist
over time. This is especially important for practical use of NEC as there is generally a delay
between conditioning/learning and behavior influenced by learned associations. For example,
consumers might see an advertisement using a celebrity (US) to condition a brand’s (CS)
image, but the purchase decision (which should be influenced by the conditioned brand
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image) will be made several days later in a store. Thus, we replicated Experiment 1 with one
modification: Logos were rated one day after conditioning.
Method
Participants. Thirty-eight Universität Heidelberg psychology students (28 women, 10
men) participated for 3€ payment or course credit. Design and materials were the same as in
Experiment 1.
Procedure. Experimental sessions included up to six participants. Instructions and
conditioning were identical to Experiment 1. The only modification was measurement time:
After conditioning, participants were asked to return the next day to complete the study.
When they returned, participants rated each logo on the five attributes and likeability. After
completing the rating scales, experimenters thanked, paid, and debriefed participants.
Results
Thirty-two participants returned the next day; six participants returned two days after
conditioning. This delay variation did not influence results in any way. The analyses and
results in general were overall similar to Experiment 1. First, logos did not significantly differ
in valence, F(4, 34) = 0.85, ns (but see also Footnote 2). However, US condition (single vs.
multiple) showed an effect and is included in the following report.
Across CSs, we tested whether logo CSs paired with celebrity USs representing a
specific attribute were rated higher on that attribute than other logo CSs paired with celebrity
USs representing other attributes, using the same contrasts as in Experiment 1. Four of the
contrast scores differed significantly from zero: humorous logo M = 0.99, SD = 2.90, t(37) =
2.11, p = .042; sexy logoM = 0.85, SD = 2.32, t(37) = 2.26, p = .030; athletic logoM = 0.97,
SD = 2.59, t(37) = 2.32, p = .026; and soft logoM = 1.08, SD = 2.85, t(37) = 2.34, p = .025.
Only the “educated logo” contrast did not differ significantly from zero, M = 0.64, SD = 2.66,
t(37) = 1.48, ns. Overall, the mean of all contrasts significantly differed from zero,M = 0.91,
SD = 1.39, t(37) = 4.03, p < .001. US-condition (single-US vs. multiple-USs) had no
significant main or interaction effects, all Fs < 1, ns. In sum, analyses showed that all
attributes were successfully conditioned to the respective logo, except for educated.
Similar to Experiment 1, we tested within CSs (see Footnote 3) whether only the
intended attribute was rated higher than the other attributes. We used separate mixed
ANOVAs with US-condition (single-US vs. multiple-USs) as between factor and remains vs.
intended attribute as repeated measure. Again, we tested z-standardized scores of the
conditioned attribute against the remains-score. Table 1’s lower half shows the full pattern of
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the z-standardized means. While the analysis across CSs replicates Experiment 1 perfectly,
the pattern of the comparison within CSs was less clear. The ratings of the humorous and
athletic logos replicated Experiment 1’s results: The humorous logo was rated higher on
humorous than on remains, F(1, 36) = 7.69, p = .009; and the athletic logo was rated higher
on athletic than on remains, F(1, 36) = 8.12, p = .007. For the other logos, we found
interactions with US-condition (single- vs. multiple-USs): The sexy logo was not rated higher
on sexy than on remains, F(1, 36) = 2.35, ns; however, there was a significant interaction of
conditioning and US-condition, F(1, 36) = 4.77, p = .036. When a logo was paired with only
one celebrity (single-US condition), the logo was rated higher on sexy (M = 0.48, SD = 0.75)
than on remains (M = -0.01, SD = 0.45); this was not true in the multiple-USs condition (sexy:
M = 0.00, SD = 0.88 vs. remains: M = 0.09, SD = 0.33). Also, the educated logo was not rated
significantly higher on educated than on remains, F(1, 35) = 2.61, ns. However, there was a
significant main effect of US-condition, F(1, 35) = 7.72, p = .009. In the single-US condition
overall ratings were higher (sexy:M = 0.54, SD = 1.02 vs. remains: M = 0.03, SD = 0.51),
than in the multiple-USs condition (sexy:M = -0.17, SD = 0.83 vs. remains: M = -0.22, SD =
0.48). Finally, the soft logo was rated higher on soft than on remains, F(1, 36) = 5.52, p =
.024. Above that, the significant interaction of conditioning and US-condition (F(1, 36) =
5.48, p = .025) shows that a logo paired with only one celebrity (single-US condition) was
rated higher on soft (M = 0.55, SD = 0.68) than on remains (M = -0.15, SD = 0.47); this was
not true in the multiple-USs condition (soft:M = 0.13, SD = 0.96 vs. remains: M = 0.12, SD =
0.55).
Discussion
Experiment 2 showed that NEC effects persisted over time. Even after a delay of one
or two days, logos were rated higher on their conditioned attribute than other logos were on
this attribute (analysis across CSs, equaling basic NEC effects). These results replicated
Experiment 1. Furthermore, in the analysis within CSs, we found the expected effects that
logos paired with humorous, athletic, and soft celebrities were rated higher on the conditioned
attribute than on the other attributes (equaling specific NEC effects). Yet, for sexy and
educated logos this was only true in the single-US condition. Thus, the results are less clear
than in Experiment 1, but we are still confident to say that NEC effects for logos paired with
celebrities endure over time. Given the fact that participants saw multiple CS-US pairings for
less than five minutes, they made quite differentiated logo ratings even one or two days after
conditioning.
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So far, we chose USs pre-tested to represent only one attribute; however, celebrities or
other US-entities might be associated with a great number of miscellaneous attributes. It is not
clear yet whether only the intended attribute was associated with the logo, or if other US
attributes were conditioned, too. Therefore, Experiment 3 accentuated specific celebrity
attributes by providing participants with information about celebrity USs prior conditioning.
By using this strategy of accentuating attributes we intended to provide first evidence for a
strategic control of NEC effects.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 intended to show that by priming a specific US attribute of a multi-
attribute US only this particular attribute will be associated with a paired CS. This method is
based on early findings on impression formation by Higgins and colleagues (1977). They
showed that priming (i.e., activating) a specific trait category by unobtrusively exposing
participants to traits during a color detection task influences the evaluation of a following
stimulus. We selected four celebrities widely known in Germany (i.e., Angelina Jolie, Anke
Engelke, Joey Kelly, and Vitali Klitschko) that represent at least two distinct attributes which
were not correlated with all other attributes in the set. For each celebrity we chose an easily
accessible dominant attribute (e.g., sexy for Angelina Jolie) and an also known, but less
accessible non-dominant one (e.g., familial for Jolie). The selected attributes were distinct
from each other (e.g., sexy, familial, strong, educated), thereby ensuring that it is possible to
obtain differential conditioning effects on these attributes. We assumed that by providing
participants with information priming one particular celebrity attribute, USs would be
categorized in accordance with the primed information, and thus, only the primed attribute
would be associated with CSs afterwards. Further, it was of interest whether priming and
afterwards conditioning would be equally successful for dominant compared to non-dominant
attributes.
Method
Participants, design, and materials. Seventy-seven visitors (56 women, 21 men) of a
Heidelberg student café participated for 5€ payment. Four neutral logos from Experiment 1
and 2 served as CSs and were randomly assigned to one of four celebrity USs for each
participant. USs were pictures of Angelina Jolie, Anke Engelke, Joey Kelly, and Vitali
Klitschko. For each celebrity we chose two attributes which should be primed: familial vs.
sexy for Jolie, socially committed vs. funny for Engelke, athletic vs. musical for Kelly, and
educated vs. strong for Klitschko. The attributes were chosen so that one of them was a
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dominant attribute (sexy, funny, musical, strong), which is easily accessible for the respective
celebrity; and one was a non-dominant, less accessible but still known attribute of the
celebrity (familial, socially committed, athletic, educated). To analyze possible differences for
dominant and non-dominant attributes, we introduced the within-participant factor
dominance. Primingwas a between-participants factor andwe counterbalanced between-
participants which celebrity attributes were primed in newsfeeds prior conditioning. As we
used four celebrity USs and two different attributes for each USs, we decided against a
completely counterbalanced design (resulting in six conditions), because full
counterbalancing would have created an unreasonable number of conditions. For example, to
prime familial for Angelina Jolie the newsfeed read “Angelina Jolie is mother of six children;
three of them are adopted. Jolie is always keen to be a good mother and spends as much time
with her family as possible”; to prime sexy it read “Angelina Jolie is one of Hollywood’s most
attractive actresses. In many movies she outstands by her strong sex appeal. 2004, she was
elected ‘sexiest woman alive’”. Additionally to the verbal attribute priming, different
celebrity pictures were used to further emphasize the primed attribute. For example, to prime
familial Jolie was shown walking down a street with three of her kids; to prime sexy she was
depicted in a wet soaked white shirt and tight leather pants. To minimize demand awareness
we also used four additional celebrities as filler stimuli in the newsfeed phase. A Visual Basic
program controlled instructions, stimulus presentation, and recorded the dependent variables
Procedure. Experimental sessions included up to six participants. Experimenters
recruited participants from a Heidelberg student café and led them to an adjacent room. They
were seated in front of laptops and provided with ear-cushions against distracting noise. Then
the Visual Basic program started and nstructions informed participants that they would
participate in a media study. For the newsfeed phase, they were asked to read some short
information about celebrities. When they clicked a button the first celebrity picture was
shown with a short text priming a specific attribute of this celebrity. To ensure participants
would not simply click through the newsfeeds, the button to go on with the next celebrity was
enabled not until 4s of reading time. After reading the newsfeeds for all celebrity USs and
filler-celebrities, the program instructed participants that next they would see a series of
pictures and should evaluate logos afterwards. In the conditioning phase, each CS was
randomly assigned to a US and was paired nine times with the same US; resulting in 36
pairings. Conditioning procedures were the same as in Experiment 1 and 2. After
conditioning, participants rated each logo (CS) on all attributes (educated, strong, athletic,
musical, socially committed, funny, familial, sexy) and on likeability on 11-point scales
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(ranging from e.g. 0 = “not sexy” to 10 = “very sexy”). Finally as a manipulation check,
participants were asked to rate the celebrities (USs) on the same attributes and likeability.
After finishing the rating scales, the experimenter thanked, paid, and debriefed participants.
Results
To check whether priming was successful, we analyzed whether celebrities (USs) were
rated differently on their two respective attributes depending on the priming condition. To
ensure that probable differences in scale usage did not distort results, we z-standardized
participants’ ratings for each attribute. Due to the not completely counterbalanced design, we
used the SAS Proc Mixed procedure instead of an ordinary ANOVA to analyze this mixed
linear model and control for dependencies in the data. We ran the Proc Mixed procedure over
all celebrities including priming and dominance as class variables to predict the attribute
ratings. There were main effects of priming, F(1, 48) = 34.66, p < .001, and of dominance,
F(1, 76) = 135.25, p < .001. That is, when non-dominant attributes were primed attribute
ratings were generally higher than when dominant attributes were primed; and independent of
which attribute was primed dominant attributes were rated higher than non-dominant ones.
Showing that manipulation of attribute priming was successful, there was a significant
priming-dominance interaction, F(1, 48) = 82.88, p < .001. Celebrities were rated low on the
non-dominant attribute when the dominant attribute was primed (M = -0.27, SD = 0.81);
however, priming the non-dominant attribute increased the non-dominant attribute’s rating (M
= 0.61, SD = 0.65). Celebrities were rated very high on the dominant attribute when it was
primed (M = 0.95, SD = 0.67); but also when the non-dominant attribute was primed
celebrities were rated high on the dominant attribute (M = 0.76, SD = 0.77). In sum, the
priming manipulation was successful.
To be used in the analyses of logo (CSs) ratings, we z-standardized participants’ logo
ratings for each attribute. Positive values indicate high ratings of a given attribute relative to
the participant’s mean rating of that attribute across logos. In the first analysis, we analyzed
whether a logo’s rating on a specific attribute (i.e., for each logo the two attributes the
respective celebrity was associated with) was influenced by the attribute priming; and whether
there was a difference for dominant and non-dominant attributes. Therefore, we ran the same
Proc Mixed procedure over all logos including priming and dominance as class variables to
predict the logos’ attribute rating (cf., analyzing celebrity USs ratings). There was no main
effect of priming (F < 1, ns), but a main effect of dominance, so that logos were rated higher
on the dominant attributes than on the non-dominant attributes of the celebrity USs they were
paired with, F(1, 76) = 13.54, p < .001. More important, the ratings were qualified by a
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significant priming-dominance interaction, F(1, 48) = 11.94, p = .001. As can be seen in
Figure 1, logos were rated low on the non-dominant attribute when the dominant attribute was
primed; however, priming the non-dominant attribute increased the non-dominant attribute’s
rating. Logos were already rated quite high on the dominant attribute when the non-dominant
attribute was primed; however, they were rated even higher on the dominant attribute when it
was primed.
Figure 1:Mean z-standardized ratings of logo CSs on dominant and
non-dominant attributes dependent on attribute priming (dominant vs.
non-dominant). Error bars represent standard errors of the means.
In a further analysis (see Footnote 3), we checked for the specific NEC effect by
analyzing whether a logo was rated higher on the primed attribute of its respective celebrity
than on all other attributes (similar to the analysis within CSs of Experiment 1 and 2); and
whether there was a difference for dominant and non-dominant attributes. Therefore, we ran
another Proc Mixed model over all logos including priming, dominance and attribute-focus as
class variables to predict attribute ratings. Attribute-focus was defined as a new variable with
the levels target attribute and remains: Target attribute was either the dominant or non-
dominant attribute rating of the respective logo dependent on the factors priming and
dominance (e.g., for CS paired with Angelina Jolie, when non-dominant attribute (familial) is
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primed and when non-dominant attribute (familial) is considered, target attribute is familial;
when however non-dominant attribute is primed but dominant attribute (sexy) is considered,
target attribute is sexy). Remains was the mean of the z-standardized logo ratings on the
remaining attributes and likeability excluding the respective target attribute’s rating. The full
pattern of results is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Mean z-standardized ratings of logo CSs on target attribute and remains split up
for dominance (dominant vs. non-dominant) and for attribute priming (dominant vs. non-
dominant). Error bars represent standard errors of the means.
There was no main effect of priming and no interaction of priming and attribute-focus,
all Fs < 1, ns. There were significant main effects of dominance, F(1, 76) = 8.51, p = .005,
and attribute-focus, F(1, 76) = 35.50, p < .001. Thus, the dominant attribute was rated higher
than the non-dominant one; and the target attribute (i.e., the dominant or the non-dominant)
was rated higher than the remaining attributes. Further, there were significant interactions of
priming and dominance, F(1, 48) = 7.51, p = .009, dominance and attribute-focus, F(1, 76) =
14.07, p < .001, and the most interesting one, the 3-way interaction of priming, dominance
and attribute-focus, F(1, 48) = 14.41, p < .001. When the dominant attribute was primed the
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dominant attribute – as target attribute – was rated much higher than the remaining attributes;
the non-dominant attribute, however, was not rated higher than the remains. Yet, when the
non-dominant attribute was primed, the non-dominant but also the dominant attribute – as
target attributes – were rated higher than the respective remaining attributes. Thus, NEC of
specific attributes was successful, yet, with an advantage for dominant celebrity attributes.
Discussion
Experiment 3 showed how specific NEC effects can be strategically controlled: By
priming a US attribute this specific attribute was associated with a CS after repeated CS-US
pairing. For example, a logo that was repeatedly paired with Angelina Jolie, for whom the
attribute familial was primed prior to conditioning, was rated more familial than when the
attribute sexy was primed for Jolie. Moreover, the same logo’s familial rating was higher than
the mean of the remaining attribute ratings when familial was primed (analysis within CSs).
Furthermore, the results revealed that dominant attributes (i.e., Jolie – sexy, Engelke – funny,
Kelly – musical, Klitschko – strong) were rated higher than non-dominant ones independent
of which attribute was primed. It seems as if even when other, less prominent USs attributes
are primed, dominant attributes are still prominent and consequently will be associated with
the paired CSs as well.
General Discussion
The current study showed that non-evaluative conditioning (NEC) procedures allow
conditioning very differentiated and specific attributes to neutral stimuli. Further, although
US entities represented more than one attribute (i.e., multi-attribute USs) it was possible to
condition only intended attributes. In three experiments, we repeatedly paired neutral logos
(CSs) with celebrities representing an attribute (USs). Experiments 1 and 2 showed that CSs
were subsequently associated with only the specific attribute their paired US represented, but
were not associated with other, also positive, attributes. Although, all attributes were positive
in valence, CSs were not associated with all positive attributes due to a general positive
feeling associated with the CSs after conditioning. Thus, the study showed that the attribute
associations with a person or object are acquired through a simple learning mechanism,
namely NEC. That is, mere spatial and temporal contiguity of CSs and USs is sufficient to
associate specific attributes with initially neutral stimuli.
Experiment 1 and 2 conditioned the attributes humorous, sexy, educated, athletic, and
soft to logo CSs within one conditioning phase. As CSs were rated high only on the respective
conditioned attribute, we could provide first evidence for specific NEC (i.e., changing only
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specific attribute associations). This finding provides further evidence for the assumption
already made by Förderer and Unkelbach (2011a): Through repeated pairing of stimuli not
only valence can be changed but also specific attribute associations can be created. Moreover,
Experiment 2 showed that, after less than five minutes of conditioning, participants gave
differentiated CS ratings even one or two days after conditioning. Contrary to our initial
hypothesis in nearly all analyses there was no difference in NEC effects when one (single-US
condition) or three USs (multiple-USs condition) were used. Thus, it seems that for each
celebrity US the respective attribute was easily accessible and consequently was associated
with paired logo CSs. It was not necessary to further accentuate the attribute by pairing a logo
with several celebrities representing the same attribute.
In Experiment 1 and 2, we selected the celebrities which were pre-rated high on only
one of the relevant attributes. Thus, although celebrity USs are in general associated with
many attributes, we did not use celebrity USs strongly associated with several attributes.
Therefore, Experiment 3 used celebrity USs definitely associated with more than one
attribute. Moreover, to control which attributes should be conditioned we implemented a
priming procedure prior to conditioning. The procedure was based on findings in research on
person perception from Higgins and colleagues (1977; Ford, Stangor, & Duan, 1994) who
showed that primed/activated trait categories influenced stimulus evaluation. We provided
participants with newsfeeds about celebrity USs to accentuate either one or the other attribute
they represent. Results showed that attribute priming was successful and NEC effects were
moderated by priming. That is, participants rated CSs higher on the primed attribute than on
other attributes. Further, there was an interesting difference for dominant and non-dominant
attributes: Independent of which attribute was primed, dominant attributes which were easily
accessible (e.g., sexy for Angelina Jolie) were always associated with CSs. Non-dominant
attributes which were less accessible (e.g., familial for Jolie) were only associated with CSs
when they were primed and, thus, made accessible. Thus, for the practical use of the priming
procedure in conditioning attributes one has to know which celebrity attributes are dominant
and easily accessible dominant attributes as they will be conditioned in any case.
At this point, it is interesting to highlight differences to prior studies on NEC. Prior
studies trying to condition attributes used USs which were clearly opposed on the to-be-
conditioned attribute. For example, Meersmans and colleagues (2005) used male and female
USs, and Förderer and Unkelbach (2011a) used athletic and non-athletic USs. Thus, the
conditioning context (i.e., stimuli presented) accentuated the attribute which should be
conditioned. This might have shifted participants’ focus of attention to the attribute and, thus,
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made conditioning of this attributes possible. Gast and Rothermund (2011) already showed
for EC that EC effects depend on a valence focus of participants. If participants focused their
attention on other stimulus dimensions instead of valence no EC effects emerged. We assume
it is the stimulus dimension primarily distinguishing between USs (either valence or a specific
attribute) which will be attended and conditioned to CSs. In classical EC studies using
pictures of positive and negative USs, valence was the primarily distinguishing dimension
and, thus, valence was conditioned (e.g., Walther, 2002). In prior NEC studies, an attribute
like US gender was the primarily distinguishing dimension which was consequently
conditioned. In the current study, multi-attribute USs were used to condition several distinct
attributes; yet, there were no clearly opposed USs accentuating specific attributes. This makes
it even more intriguing that we found differentiated conditioning of specific attributes within
one conditioning phase. We assume that within the current conditioning contexts for each
celebrity US the attribute primarily distinguishing him/her from the other celebrity USs was
prominent and consequently conditioned. In another context using other celebrity USs, other
attributes might be the primarily distinguishing ones and consequently other attributes of the
same celebrity US might be conditioned. Thus, in the context of Obama, Clooney, and Carrey
the primarily distinguishing attribute of Vladimir Klitschko (cf., Experiment 1/2) is athletic;
however, in a context of Tyson and Valuev the distinguishing attribute might rather be
educated as only Klitschko owns a Ph.D. degree.
We would like to stress that in Experiment 1 and 2 celebrity attributes were not extra
primed visually or verbally; they were easily accessible on their own (as they were selected
on this basis of a pre-test). Even in Experiment 3, dominant attributes were associated with
CSs in both the dominant and non-dominant priming condition (where US attributes were
primed verbally and visually) and, thus, must have been easily accessible as well. Thus, no
specific priming was necessary to condition attributes which were already prominent; we
assume participants made indirect inferences about these attributes on their own. Some EC
studies already showed that not only bottom-up, but also top-down processes play an
important role in moderating EC effects supporting a propositional process causing EC effects
(e.g., De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009; Fiedler & Unkelbach,
2010; Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011b). Yet, further research is needed to examine the cognitive
processes underlying NEC and to understand which factors, in addition to the priming
implemented in the current study, moderate which US’s attributes will be conditioned. So far,
we can only hypothesize that top-down processes for NEC are even more important than for
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EC, as it might require more cognitive effort to infer specific attributes than recognizing a
US’s valence.
Practical Implications
Our findings provide intriguing practical implications for the formation of brand
image and offer a parsimonious explanation for the mental processes involved. Brand image
is defined as a “set of associations linked to the brand that consumers hold in memory”
(Keller, 1993; p. 2). Some of these associations can stem from inferences made about entities
like brand users, company employees, or celebrities endorsing a brand (Aaker, 1997). The
meaning transfer model of McCracken (1989) postulates that brand image is created through
attribute transfer from a celebrity endorsing a brand to the brand itself. However, McCracken
only describes the phenomenon without providing any empirical evidence or psychological
process causing meaning transfer. NEC procedures provide a possible cause for this meaning
transfer: Through repeated co-occurrence of brand (CS) and celebrity (US) attributes will be
associated with the brand and thereby form the brand image. Thus, the current study provides
first empirical evidence for meaning transfer according to McCracken’s model and explains
celebrity endorsement effects on brand image through NEC. Moreover, our study shows that
mere contiguity of logo/brand and celebrity is sufficient for meaning transfer. This makes
NEC a more parsimonious phenomenon to transfer meaning to brands than celebrity
endorsement. Actual celebrity endorsement would need active commitment to and usage of
the brand by the celebrity, which NEC does not.
When brand image should be formed through mere brand-celebrity pairings (i.e., NEC
procedures) there are some things marketers should keep in mind: As our findings on attribute
priming in Experiment 3 showed marketers can make use of different celebrity attributes and
accentuate specific ones with different information provided about the celebrity or using
different ad contexts, for example. However, they need to notice which attributes are readily
associated with the celebrities, respectively which attributes are dominant. This is especially
important when a celebrity’s image recently suffered from negative publicity. After Tiger
Woods cheated on his wife, he was not only associated with smart, athletic, and handsome,
but also with unfaithful. Thus, this new prominent attribute might be associated with the
endorsed brand, too. Although the use of one or more celebrity USs did not cause any
differences in NEC effects in Experiment 1 and 2, a strategy to minimize the risk of
associations of unintended negative attributes is to use more than one celebrity endorsing the
brand. Thereby, marketers further accentuate the intended attribute and minimize the risk that
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probable negative celebrity attributes might be associated with the endorsed brand (see also
US-revaluation effects in Sweldens et al., 2010).
Limitation and further research
A limitation of our study but also of (N)EC studies in general is that assumptions are
based on lab experiment using computer programs to condition valence or attributes.
Participants see the repeated pairing of stimuli on a grey computer screen and are afterwards
asked to rate the CSs on valence or attributes. These procedures do clearly not resemble a
natural learning context in which associations with a person or object are learned and
preferences are acquired. Moreover, the artificial setting can draw attention to the
experiment’s purpose which often raises the question about the influence of demand
awareness. In the current study, we did not gather data about demand awareness; prior studies
however detected NEC effects also on indirect measures which are less prone to the influence
of demand effects (e.g., Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011a; Meersmans et al., 2005, Exp. 7).
Independent of the demand effects, future EC and NEC research should strive for more
natural learning settings to see whether effects would still emerge. Yet, based on the negative
influence of cognitive load on EC effects (Field & Moore, 2005; Dedonder, Corneille,
Yzerbyt, & Kuppens, 2010) we assume that (N)EC effects in natural surroundings will be
smaller.
Another aim for further NEC as well as EC research should be to find out which
behavioral effects conditioned valence and attributes have. That is, future experiments should
implement behavior measures like decision or purchase tasks in addition to mere
valence/attribute ratings. This would provide first empirical prove for the assumption that
conditioned preferences are strong enough to influence behavior.
Conclusions
Based on findings in three experiments, we assume that simple NEC procedures cause
changes of specific attribute associations beyond changes of valence even when multi-
attribute USs are used. That is, due to spatial and temporal contiguity of neutral stimuli with
stimuli representing an attribute the respective attribute will be associated with the neutral
stimuli. Consequently, CSs are associated only with the respective attribute, but not with other
attributes of the same valence. We provided further evidence for NEC as a general associative
learning phenomenon and provided a parsimonious explanation of meaning transfer to brands.
Moreover, we showed how this learning phenomenon can be influenced and thereby
controlled by attribute priming.
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